




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
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Foreign Negotiations and Transactions
for several Years past.

Being a complete ANSWER to
Politicks on both Sides, &c.

In a LETTER to a Member of the
present PARLIAMENT.

*In Consiliario imprimis requiritur Temperantia, quia
novandis, quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa
ignea. Curtius.*

*Consilia callida & audacia prima fronte læta, tractatu
dura, eventu tristia. Eras. in Epist.*

L O N D O N:

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SERIES

WISDOM AND POLICY

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S I R,



Xperience has convinced us that few *Corruptions*, either of a publick or a private Nature, can withstand the Power of a free *Enquiry*. 'Tis therefore *Englishmen* justly set so great a Value upon that important Privilege, the Freedom of speaking and writing their Sentiments upon Points of the highest Concernment. To this we owe the Defeat of Popery and Arbitrary Power, the Disgrace of Superstition, Enthusiasm and Persecution, and the Overthrow of those slavish Doctrines of Passive-Obedience and Non-Resistance. Of its irresistible Efficacy we have an ever memorable Instance, in the Destruction of a late unrighteous Administration. Though the Friends of the *Hanover* Succession were treated with the greatest Tyranny and

Oppression ; their Writings burnt by the common Hangman ; a Member expell'd the House of Commons, and others underwent the most grievous Imprisonments, expensive Prosecutions, and exorbitant Fines ; yet *Reason* and *Argument* were at length triumphant. If when the Press was near being so restrain'd, that the *Ministry* might, in Effect, have the sole Use of it, and scarce any Thing saw the Light, *sans Privilege du Minister* : If under this Restraint of the great *Palladium* of our Liberties, publick Virtue and Patriotism prevail'd, what have we to fear, while we enjoy this invaluable Blessing in its most desirable Extent ? Certain it is, that no Government ever exercis'd so much Lenity and Forbearance towards its *Opposers*, as the present have done towards *theirs* ; never were the secret Springs of Action, the nicest Machines of State-Policy so freely scrutiniz'd and examin'd into ; nor ever were, or perhaps ever will be, more to the Dishonour of those who shall take upon them to determine against the Voice of the Representative.

So peculiarly nice and delicate is the Situation of a *Minister of State* in *Britain*, that it is next to an Impossibility he should support himself long against a powerful Opposition ; provided his Conduct will not bear the Test of the most rigorous Enquiry. A GENTLEMAN consider'd in this Station, oblig'd to be obedient to his *Prince*, and ever liable to the Maledictions, if not the Persecution of the People ; hardly ever rewarded with Praise for his best Actions, and certain to have his worst aggravated and condemn'd ; seldom sure of his Friends, but always expos'd to his Enemies ; subject to their most embitter'd Opposition from without Doors, as well as from within : In so ticklish a Situation, where is the Man whose Conduct is not as unexceptionable as his Wisdom must be profound, that

can baffle the Attempts of his Enemies to destroy him? We say that nothing but *Truth* and *Virtue* can turn the Edge of Satire and Ridicule; and equally certain it is, that nothing but a just and honourable *Administration* could maintain its Ground against that Hurricane of Opposition the present have met with: So secure are the Liberties of *Britons*, that the Event is as much a Criterion of the one, as it is of the other. Nor can any Man in Power, if he has any Value for Liberty, or the Happiness of his Country, be offended at the free Examination of all his Actions. If they are *right*, he will get by the *Enquiry*; and if they are *wrong*, 'tis just he should lose by it. The present *Ministry* have hitherto got by the *Enquiry*; and defeated the Designs of their Enemies. If then the *Event* be a Criterion in this Case, as the present *Enquirers* have allow'd, * have we not great Reason to believe the present an *upright* Administration? Not that I would be understood to argue that this Judgment from the *Event*, is always the Judgment of Reason; though I should be justified therein by the Adversaries of the Government, who ground the Merit of a late extraordinary Production upon this Characteristick. If this Doctrine be applicable to any Event, that which I have pitch'd upon, perhaps, is the least of any, liable to Objection. However, all that I would pretend to infer from the hitherto Success and Stability of the *Ministry* against their Adversaries, is, that the Presumption of publick Virtue, from the great Delicacy of a *Ministerial* Situation, lies in their Favour. But since it is pretended that the *Ministry* have supported themselves by the most infamous and corrupt Arts, and not by that Conduct which alone ought to support them; it cannot at this Juncture be unseasonable to take a Retrospect

* *Craftsman*, Vol. VI. pag 41.

troſpect of *Ministry* and *Antiministry Politicks* : For the Fulneſs of Time is come, that we may judge with the greateſt Certainty and Assurance, who have laboured to uphold the Honour and Happineſs of this Kingdom, and who to deſtroy both ; who have had the true Inter-eſt of *Trade* and *Navigation* at Heart, and who have ſtruggled in Earneſt to ruin them : In a word, who are the *true*, who the *false* Friends of *Great Britain*.

Many have determin'd this Point in Favour of the *Writers* againſt the Government ; but for no other Reaſon than upon account of the temporary Fits of Popularity, which they have ſometimes receiv'd. Theſe have kept up the Spirits of the Enemies of our Peace for a time ; but I fear, like thoſe habit-ed to ſtrong Cordials, they have flagg'd the more afterwards. 'Tis to be hoped that the Pulse of this Nation will ever beat high for Liberty ; not ſo high however as to border upon Lunacy. As theſe *Gentlemen* have ſported with the Paſſions of the People, they in return have tantaliz'd them with Hopes of Honours they are never likely to enjoy. The People were heated when firſt theſe Projects were debated, but they are now cool again ; they laugh'd ; they carry'd on the Humour ; they blew the Coals on ſome Occaſions which touch'd them too tenderly ; but the Jeſt is now over ; thoſe notable Reflections and ſatyrical Hints which were found ſo pungent, and gave the Reader ſuch high Delight, are no more ; People are convinc'd that a thouſand fine Argumentations and Fabricks in the Mind concerning the Theory of Policy give an empty Satisfaction, but no Benefit, and rather ſerve to *ſwell* than *fill* the Soul.

Theſe Flights of political Enthuſiaſm are eaſily accounted for. Why the Enemies of the Government have made ſo much Noiſe in the World, its Friends ſo little by their Writings, is becauſe the
one

one have had the labouring Oar, the *defensive* and *argumentative* Part, which few understand, and fewer attend to ; the other the declamatory, satirical and defamatory Part, which all have a Taste for. The entertaining Part has been carry'd on by a *well compact* and *united* Body, who have pursu'd the same End by the same Means ; the other by a disjointed straggling Body, who, tho' they have had the same End in view, have prosecuted it by different Means. This hath given further Scope to Wit and Drollery, and by playing off one Court-Advocate against another, in trivial and immaterial Points, have gain'd Devotees and Admirers, while their Antagonists more *deep* are unread, as being unrelish'd by the *Shallows* of the Age. In short, the *Ministry* have labour'd more to do *right* than they have to make it *appear*.

Our Satirists, sensible of these Advantages over their Adversaries, have made the most of them. When they have been hunted down with Argument, they have turn'd suddenly upon their Pursuers, and with an overbearing, supercilious and magisterial Air have answered *Reasoning* with a Rhapsody of Scurrility. Thus we find throughout all their Writings the nauseous Repetition of *Mercenaries*, *Court Prostitutes*, *Hirelings*, with a thousand other polite Epithets, to draw off the Attention of the Publick from Argument, which they are not over fond of, and fix it upon low *Buffoonry*, tart *Repartees*, *Banter* and *Ridicule*. This Affectation of Superiority over their Adversaries indiscriminately, the intolerable Liberty of dressing them in Bear-Skins, in hope to bait them easily, and to appear GREAT, VICTORIOUS and TRIUMPHANT ; the Air of Publick-spiritedness they have impudently assum'd, have rais'd an exalted Idea of their Persons in the Minds of the Vulgar, while they have lessen'd and depreciated those of their Opponents. By such low

Artifices did our popular Patriots at first gain Ground, and by the same Stratagems have they with Difficulty maintain'd it : But let them remember that common Sense is still uppermost, that a Redundancy of Spleen can never conceal the Impotence of Argument, nor the Bluster of Purity overshadow the deepest Corruption : It ever was the nature of a criminal Faction to be noisy and clamorous, and, like true *Bullies*, look big, even while they are beaten.

There is another Art which these *Gentlemen* have practis'd from time to time, when their Cause has been near expiring with no small Success. When they have pretty well exhausted a *Topick* in their way, with awakening Interludes of *Allegory*, *Fable*, *Dreams* and *History*, to hit every Taste they intend to impose on ; then comes a masterly Hand, draws all their scatter'd Forces together, and fights the Battel of the whole *Juncto* with their own *Auxiliaries*. This gives fresh Vigour to their dying Cause, and that which appear'd weak and defenceless in the Hands of a single *Combatant*, puts on a new Face of mighty Power and Pageantry, and only from wearing of a new *Livery*.

By such Bladders of Art have these Gentlemen kept their Heads above Water, or long since they must inevitably have sunk. That their mean Artifices, and silly Expedients of all Kinds have been oft expos'd, is no Discouragement to these bold and rash Censurers. They still Swagger, bid Defiance, and throw down the Gauntlet. But they are mistaken if they think *Englishmen* will blindly sacrifice their Judgments to Men thus swoln with Vanity. A late Instance of political Pride and Folly, we have in a sort of Challenge * given to the World to answer an extraordinary Performance, call'd, *Politicks on both Sides*, &c ; a Performance of that Kind I have

* See *Postscript to a late Craftsman*.

have been just describing ; wherein the united Force, Strength and Power of the whole *Party* are drawn together, and a compleat System of their *Politicks* given us in Miniature. That their Adversaries hitherto have not condescended to Reply, the Writers are too sensible is owing to nothing but a just Contempt of that Production ; for what appear'd weak and indefensible by *Piece-Meal*, can never appear otherwise in the *Gross*.

However, Sir, in Obedience to your Commands, I shall, without Ceremony, give you my Thoughts upon that Piece, since you have freely told me it is the Boast of the *Party*, what their Adherents retail as unanswerable, and what has done no small Prejudice to that Cause you are pleas'd to say I am engag'd in.

'Tis true, Sir, I have with Sincerity engag'd in the Cause of my Country, as it appears to me ; and before I have done with the *Writer* before me, I'll leave every Person of Integrity and Honour, who has more Regard to Truth than Party, to judge whether I have Reason to be asham'd of my Cause, and whether that Performance ought to prosecute me to the contrary.

Was a Person, unacquainted with the Affairs of *Europe* for some Years past, to form his Judgment of them from that Composition, how wild and extravagant must be his Notions ? We are there taught, that *England*, as the *Principal*, form'd an *Alliance* with *France*, *Holland*, *Sweden* and *Denmark*, with a Design to defeat the most dreadful and formidable Effects of a very *harmless* and *inoffensive Treaty* between *Spain* and the *Emperor* : That *she* was struck with such a Pannick, as to put all *Europe* into Convulsions, when nothing was contriving but her own Honour and Prosperity ! For our Writer tells us, that instead of being in

an hurry to put our selves into a Posture of Defence, we ought to have acceded to the very *Treaty* that alarm'd us. * Now, *Sir*, if you can have so small a share of Faith, as to believe that the Courts of *France*, *Holland*, *Sweden*, *Denmark*, and *England*, were all in a *Dream*, and that only a small Body of *Gentlemen* in this Island were awake; then, *Sir*, you will find no Difficulty to swallow the first Part of our Writer's Performance. For the whole Conduct and Transactions of these several Courts, as you shall see presently, bear ample Testimony, for several Years together, that this *Treaty of Vienna* was not hatch'd for the Benefit of *Europe*, no more than the Welfare of *England*. Was there no other Evidence than the Concurrence of these several Powers to oppose the new Allies, would it not, have great Weight to inforce a Belief, that somewhat had been projected that foreboded no Good to *Christendom*? For all these Powers to unite so heartily, steadfastly and sincerely, and at so extraordinary an Expence, as will appear by the Sequel, to oppose a Phantom, that existed no where but in the Brain of the *English Ministry*, looks so much like the Spirit of *Quixotism*, that none but *Knight's Errants* sure can believe it.

So certain was the Court of *France* that the *Vienna Allies* had form'd an *offensive Alliance*, highly prejudicial to the Interest of *Europe*, that the Count de *Mouville*, Secretary of State to the King of *France*, expressly charges the Court of *Spain* with it, in a Letter written by him to the *Nuncio Massei*, Minister to his Catholick Majesty. The Count, after having pathetically expostulated with the King of *Spain* upon his being the first, who by previous Proceedings, made a Breach in the Peace of *Europe*, says, "What is yet more sur-
" prising

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 9.

“ prising is, that at the Time when the King of
 “ *Spain* is exhausting his Country of all the Gold
 “ and Silver, to give immense Subsidies to a Fo-
 “ reign Power [the Emperor] he owes above
 “ Eighty Millions to *France*, for the Succours
 “ which *Lewis* the 14th furnish’d him by Land
 “ and Sea, to fix that Prince on the Throne of
 “ *Spain*; and is it possible, adds he, *to be per-*
 “ *suaded, after this, that the Treaty of Vienna is*
 “ *only defensive?*” These, Sir, are the Sentiments
 of the Court of *France* upon this Matter; but this
 Declaration, it seems, is not to be regarded, be-
 cause it was exactly conformable to that of his *Bri-*
tannick Majesty.

But the Emperor denies the Existence of any such
 Treaty, * says our Writer, and therefore it is im-
 possible it should be true. Notably reason’d indeed:
 Will not they who will do what they ought not,
 deny it when it is done? When the most solemn
 Obligation of *Treaties* will not bind enterprizing
Princes, how can we expect their mere verbal Affe-
 verations are to be regarded when their Interest
 comes in Competition? They who remember the
Utrecht Treaty, remember, I presume, the famous
 Preliminaries the *English* Ministers publish’d, as the
 Foundations of a Treaty between the Allies and
France. “ All Men of Sense were sure there must
 “ have been some *secret* Preliminaries besides agreed
 “ on between us and the *French* Ministers; but how
 “ positively, how solemnly, how constantly was
 “ this deny’d? And it continu’d to be so, till they
 “ were, after the late King’s Accession, found a-
 “ mong the Papers of a *Minister* who had a chief
 “ Hand in that Treaty, which was seiz’d by the
 “ King’s Order.” † But if this Denial be an Ar-
 gument of weight, we shall then be able to prove
 what

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 14.

† *The Treaty of Seville impartially examin’d. Printed for*
Roberts, 1730.

what these Gentlemen perhaps are not aware of; nothing less, Sir, than that there were no *Depredations* committed by the *Spaniards* upon our *English* Merchants; for the King of *Spain* absolutely denies that the Navigation of *Great Britain* was ever interrupted in the *West-Indies*, in any thing but in carrying on an unlawful Trade, solemnly prohibited by virtue of repeated Treaties.* So that if our Malecontents account this a good Foundation for Argument, with what Grace can they ever more clamour upon their darling Topick of our plundered Merchants? But to pass on from the Words of Princes, and to come to their Actions, which speak loudest and most consistently. The *Vienna Allies*, we are told, had no Design to hurt us by their Treaty, tho' in consequence thereof the one actually besieg'd *Gibraltar*, and the other so tenaciously insisted upon the Establishment of the *Ostend Trade*, and with so much Difficulty was brought to give it up! The latter of these, it seems, was no Detriment to *England*, according to the Faction; and as for the former, we ought to have acceded, says our Writer, to that Treaty, which insisted upon giving it up; because truly his late Majesty had once intimated by Letter, that he would leave it in the Breast of his Parliament to do with that Fortification as they should think meet!

Was this a sufficient Foundation for the *Spaniards* to trump up a *Treaty* in a clandestine manner, forcibly to rest that *Fortress* out of our Hands, without the Consent of Parliament? However, this *Treaty* was a very harmless Treaty, and we might have acceded to it, say our great Advocates for the Trading Interest. What! might we have given up our *Mediterranean* and our *India Trade* without Prejudice? Now, *Sir*, the Mask begins to loosen, we will

* *A Letter from the Marquis de Paz, to Mr. Stanhope.*

will take it quite off by degrees. The Faction, at this time, determining to lay a notable Scheme for their future Alarms and political Lectures, became rank *Infidels*, could by no means be brought to believe that the *Vienna Allies* meant any Evil to *Britain*, lest her subsequent Conduct should be too easily and naturally accounted for, and they of course depriv'd of their extensive Field of Satire and Invective. That this was the Cause of their *Unbelief*, we have in effect from their own Mouths. "For if
 " the Intelligence of an offensive Treaty was well
 " founded, say they, our *Ministers* were not only
 " fully justify'd in all their Precautions to defeat
 " it, but would have been justify'd in much farther
 " Lengths than they thought fit to go."* That this Intelligence, *Sir*, was well founded, the *Event*, as I before observ'd, prov'd beyond Contradiction; For the *Spaniards*, in virtue of that Treaty, laid Siege to *Gibraltar*; and the Emperor grew inflexibly obstinate to maintain, contrary to Treaties, the *Ostend Trade*. What then could the Design of the Faction be, but to inveigle and decoy their Country to give up their Trade and Possessions into the Hands of the Enemy, instead of opposing them? And this many of our judicious *Merchants* have since taken to be their Design; for, as they very justly argue, what could be the *Event* of our Accession to the *Vienna Treaty*, but coming into those Terms which the *new Allies* so strenuously insisted on? Apprehensive that such *Politicks* must inevitably open the Eyes of the Trading World, they began gradually and imperceptibly to change their Note; and tho' they were thoroughly convinc'd that the *Parliament* would never give up *Gibraltar*, yet they affected to be in the greatest Fears lest it should be weakly defended or basely betray'd. But this, *Sir*, could be nothing but barefac'd Grimace, as being quite

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 14.

quite inconsistent with their former Doctrine of Accession, and an open Insult upon the common Sense of the Trading World; for their Aim was apparently to procure its Restitution to the *Spaniard*.

Nor were their Schemes only contriv'd to dis-mantle us of our *Possessions*, and consequently of those important Branches of Trade dependent there-upon, but levell'd openly and directly against our whole *Trade* and *Navigation*. Why otherwise were we so chearfully to submit to the Establishment of the *Ostend Trade*? Here they rais'd another Mist to deceive the mercantile Part of this Kingdom: They pretended that this Trade was more the Concern of the *Dutch*, than of us.* But supposing this to be true, will it thence follow that we were wholly unconcern'd therein? Our Author, here conscious of his low Chicanery, evades a Detail of the Controversy; and instead of giving us a Review of the *Politicks on both Sides*, only obliges us with those of his own side.

“ All who have any Knowledge in the *India Trade*,
 “ says a Writer our Pamphleteer either misrepresents, or does not represent at all, saw that the
 “ *Ostenders* interfer'd with us directly in every profitable Branch of that Trade; and that it is not
 “ so with regard to the *Dutch*, whose greatest Advantage arises from the *Spice-Islands*, which they
 “ are in a Condition, by their Strength in those
 “ Parts, to keep to themselves.”† However, if the united Provinces only were likely to be undone in their main Concern, had this Company continu'd, as they esteem'd themselves to be, will the Gain of their Loss accrue to *England*? Will it not, as the Author of the *Enquiry* very justly argues, fly to those Countries where the Evil began? Will not the same Rivals which ruin the *East-India Trade* in *Holland*, inevitably ruin it in *England* also? Nay, must it not ruin

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 12.

† *Treaty of Seville consider'd*. Printed for Roberts, 1730.

ruin it sooner and more effectually here, as the *Dutch* Merchandize being free from the Burthen of Customs, whilst our Customs give the greatest Encouragement to the *Ostenders* to run and put off very large Quantities of their Goods in *England*? And by the Privileges granted by the *Vienna Treaty* of Commerce to the Emperor's Subjects, must not the like Ruin have attended our *West-India* Trade?

“ Nor would the Evil stop here, adds that
 “ Writer, but would of Necessity insinuate it self
 “ into many others of the most important
 “ Branches of our Trade, which have an undissoluble Connection one with another. The
 “ convenient Situation of the *Spanish Netherlands* between the *North* and the *South* of *Europe*, for the Purpose of an extended Trade:
 “ The Advantages of the Ports of *Ostend* and *Newport*, may vie with those of *Holland*, and
 “ be as convenient Harbours for *Privateers*, as ever *Dunkirk* it self was: The Goodness of their
 “ Rivers for communicating all Merchandize from
 “ Town to Town, at the most easy Rates: The
 “ Fruitfulness of the Country, and the easy Price
 “ of all Provisions; the Genius of the People,
 “ very well fitted for all the Improvements of
 “ Trade and Manufactures; and to animate them,
 “ the Experience and History of past Times,
 “ when they flourish'd both in *Woolen* and *Linnen* Manufactures.” These, and many more Particulars remark'd by that Author, shew the Probability of their carrying their Navigation to a great Pitch, in the Number and Strength of their Shipping, which always increases in Proportion to Manufactures. Besides, Is not all Commerce of a spreading and communicative Nature, where it meets with proper Materials and Encouragement? Had not this Evil been impeded in the Beginning, would not the Contagion have
 C spread

spread it self to many other Branches of the *British* and *Dutch* Trade, and convey'd along with it the Riches, the Strength, and the Naval Power to the *Spanish Netherlands*? We suffer'd enough in the *Dunkirk Squadron*, adds another eminent Writer *, not to be sensible what a Prejudice it would be to the *British* Commerce, to have the Squadrons always lying at *Ostend*. But supposing *Ostend* were not so near, it is infinitely our Concern not to suffer a new Naval Power to be set up, if we can possibly hinder it. If our Fleet is our Glory, and our Strength, Pray how comes it to be so? Is it not because we are superior at Sea to any other Power? But how long should we be able to maintain our Superiority, if new Naval Powers are suffer'd to arise? Is not all Strength comparative, and will not the greatest Power of any Nation become mere Weakness, if it becomes easy for the neighbouring Powers, by an Union of their Fleets, to be greatly superior to it? The *British* Fleet can no longer be considerable, than while it is greater than any that can easily be combin'd against it; but that it is impossible it should long be, if the *Emperor* can ever have a Naval Strength. This, therefore, was the great Objection we had to the *Ostend* Trade, as it laid a Foundation for a new Naval Power, which if not check'd betimes, no body can tell what it might have grown to in a few Years. — That these, *Sir*, were not vain Fears, may be seen by what has already happen'd in the *Northern Seas*. What a mighty Naval Force has there sprung up in a few Years, from very small Beginnings, under the Vigor and Management of the late *Czar*? What a Terror has this oft spread in the *Baltick*, and what Trouble and Expence has *England* been at, to prevent the fatal Effects such Naval Armaments

* *Treaty of Seville impartially examin'd*

ments would otherwise have had? Now, if we have been often in so much Danger, as is apparent we have, from so remote a Power, growing of a sudden strong at Sea, and been at so great Expence and Trouble to prevent the natural and fatal Consequences of it, what might we not justly apprehend, if a second Naval Power, and that so near our own Ports, should arise?

But, *Sir*, were it so, that *Holland* alone would have been the Sufferer by the *Ostend Trade* (which is far from being the Case) yet we may grant 'em this, and still disappoint these superlative Statesmen. For, as has been unanswerably reason'd *, Will not the Ruin of *Holland*, in the End, bring about the Ruin of *Britain*? Are not these two Nations acting in Conjunction, the Turn of the Balance of *Europe*, whenever they shall unite themselves to any other great Power, and both of them together but barely sufficient for that Purpose? Whatever therefore ruins the Trade, and exhausts the Riches and Strength of any one of those Powers, does as certainly destroy the Sufficiency of that Strength, whereby the Balance is preserved. How then, *Sir*, can it be said, as our Writer does, that the *Ostend Trade* was always treated as a Point of little Consequence to our essential Interests? How could we have acceded, as the Faction imperiously counsel'd the Court of *Great Britain*, to a Treaty calculated to wrest the Balance of Power out of the Hands of the *Protestant* Maritime Interest, and transfer it to a *Popish* one? Shall such Men be esteem'd the Champions of the Protestant Cause, and Patrons of Trade and Navigation, who have so sincerely struggled to destroy both? Before our Misunderstanding with the Imperial Court, they treated it as Criminal in the *Administration* to sit still, and suffer that

* Enquiry.

Company to Trade in the *Indies*. Now I should be glad to know how these State Criticks make it equally Criminal in the same *Ministry* to differ with the *Imperialists* upon that Head? At one Time these steddly *Politicians* tell us, that we ought to prevent *Interlopers* from running away with our Trade: At another Time we are entertain'd with a new Lesson; and the *Dutch*, it seems, are the Parties more properly concern'd to oppose such *Interlopers*, and act our Part for us. What can be pleaded in Excuse for such unhappy *Gentlemen*, but that their Heads are really turn'd, by talking backwards and forwards? Had they admitted the *Ostend Company*, so highly prejudicial in its Consequences to *Britain*, as it has been prov'd, the *Abolition* thereof must naturally have drawn too much Glory and Reputation to that *Ministry*, whose Councils procur'd it. But rather than acknowledge the Truth, what a wild and extravagant Course of *Politicks* have these Men broach'd! Had his *Imperial Majesty* succeeded in his Scheme to establish a Naval Power, would not his *Catholic Majesty* have ascrib'd, and very justly too, the *Emperor's* Success to the Alliance with him? And can we suppose that he would have been brought to Terms without Advantages equal to those the *Emperor* had obtain'd, through the Weight of his Power and Alliance? Had we therefore tamely submitted to give up our *India Trade* to the *Emperor*, we must afterwards have resign'd That of the *Mediterranean* to *Spain*, or plung'd into a *War*, after we had parted with so large a Portion of our Trade to procure *Peace*. Can we any longer doubt from what Quarter this *Politique* proceeded, when it bears the Lineaments of that of *Utrecht*? Instead of assisting succeeded *Ministers* to rectify their own memorable Errors and Mismanagement, they graciously recommended a Reiteration of the
same

same masterly Strokes ; with a Design, we may imagine, that *History* might afford the like Instances of political Folly and Treaty.

But these great Friends to *Britain*, Sir, instead of censuring the unjustifiable Conduct of the new Allies towards their Country, have extoll'd it; nay, have urg'd every Motive to instigate them to maltreat and insult us. Tho' all the World saw that the *Vienna Allies* were the first who broke in upon the Tranquillity of *Europe*, yet our Patriots saw it not. On the contrary, they spent all their Art, Sophistry and Rhetorick to saddle that Dishonour upon *Britain*; but unluckily for them it recoils upon themselves. For what Cause did they ever produce adequate to such an Effect? What Provocation proportionate to the Resentment? Many fictitious ones indeed their luxuriant Imaginations have furnish'd them with; but taking them in the very Light they have been exaggerated, they fall far short of what they are brought to justify. They have pretended our Rejection of the sole *Mediation*, and secret Engagements in the *Treaty of Madrid* 1721, occasion'd these Attempts on our Trade and Possessions; but the Event prov'd them only the Whimsies of their own Brain. For his *Catholick Majesty* solemnly deny'd the *former* to Mr. *Stanhope*; and so far from insinuating any thing like it, “ declar'd there was
 “ Reason in what his *Britannick Majesty* had urg'd
 “ for his Refusal; and that it should never make
 “ the least Alteration in his Regards to *Great Bri-*
 “ *tain.*” And sure, if these Gentlemen are any thing consistent with themselves, they will rely upon the Parole of his *Catholick*, as well as his *Imperial Majesty*. And as to the *latter*, 'tis not possible to be true; for *Spain* and the *Emperor* were at variance in 1724, nor could the powerful *Mediation* of *Britain* and *France* reconcile them. How then could a *Treaty* of 1721. be the Cause of their Union in 1725.
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when in 1724 there was so great a Difference and Misunderstanding between the two Crowns? Have not they themselves told us, and upon the very same Occasion too, that it is not *old, stale Resentments* that determine the Conduct of *Princes*? But why should a secret Article, whereby the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* * into *Italy* was pretended to be stipulated, produce so strict a Friendship, Harmony and Agreement between those Powers? Would not this at that time have rather tended to widen their Differences? Let them suppose as many supposeable Causes as they please, and let them magnify and aggravate them ever so much, what Weight can they have with any impartial Man, but to render the other Parts of their System most ridiculously absurd? For if the Affront given to *Spain* and the *Emperor* was so very exasperating as they have represented it, and if the *Vienna Alliance* was of so mild and inoffensive a nature, that we might safely and honourably have acceded to it, how was this any *Resentment* of the *Affronts*? Nay, is it not supposing what is quite contrary to the Course of natural Passions? In short, by aggravating the *Affront*, and extenuating the *Resentment*, these clear-sighted *Gentlemen* have very ingeniously overset their whole Scheme. Let us behold this notable Argument in its true Colours. *England* has highly affronted *Spain* and the *Emperor*; therefore what? Truly they, instead of shewing a natural Resentment, have enter'd into a *Treaty* advantageous to that very Power which gave the Affront! But, Sir, if we were the Aggressor, is it not more reasonable to believe the *Treaty* was of that dangerous and pernicious nature the *Hanover Allies* apprehended it to be? If the *Treaty* was not of that nature, but what we might have acceded to, is it not unnatural to suppose any such previous Provocation? Let them take which side

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* *Craftsmen*, Vol. VI. Pag. 314.

of this *Dilemma* they will, many Volumes of their Writings must be at once demolish'd, a Load of Calumny remov'd from the Door of the *Ministry*, and fix'd where it must for ever remain.

These *Spanish Advocates* would gladly make the Affront given by *France*, in sending back the *Infanta*, to be the Cause of this Treaty; but this Suggestion is equally frivolous with all the rest, and carries the like Absurdity with it. Because *France* affronted *Spain*, therefore She must enter into a Treaty with the *Emperor* to injure *Britain* and *Holland*, from whence they had receiv'd no Injury whatsoever!* Never sure was such Trumpery impos'd upon the World with the like Airs of Authority and Infallibility! What an Opinion must these Men entertain of our *English* Understandings? This high Indignity offer'd by *France* to *Spain* might naturally be suppos'd to be attended with some sharp Resentment of the latter towards the former; and indeed, according to the Opinion of the Court of *France*, as well as that of the rest of the *Hanover Allies*, *Spain* at that time breath'd nought but the deepest Revenge. This therefore may be a very good Argument to shew the *Vienna Treaty* was actually of that pernicious nature it was believ'd to be by its *Opposers*; and also to shew that *France* was a natural and proper *Ally* against *Spain*; but can never prove, with any Gloss of Reason, that we ought to suffer upon account of such Differences between those two Courts. As to the Mediation, 'tis true it was offer'd, but the Treaty was sign'd at *Vienna* before they could know the Offer was declin'd. But what puts the Point quite out of dispute is, that this Treaty was a long time in Agitation before the Mediation was offer'd, or any Resolution taken to send back the *Infanta*; *Ripperda's* full Powers for it having been sign'd *November 1724*; whereas the Resolution

to send back the *Infanta* was not notified at *Madrid* till *March* following. So that allowing six or seven Weeks for offering the Mediation to the King, and for receiving his Answer, his Majesty could not know of it till the beginning of *April*, nor could his Refusal be known at *Madrid* till towards the end of that Month; much less could the Court of *Madrid* transmit that Refusal to *Vienna* before the *Vienna* Treaty was sign'd, that being done the 30th of *April*; whereas the King's declining the Offer of the sole Mediation was not known at *Madrid* till the 24th, and the Court of *Madrid* had receiv'd Notice in *March* that all the principal Articles were agreed.

* What disputing is there against Facts and Dates? As they have often been told, they are not to be shaken by the Sound of Words and plausible Speeches.

Since then, Sir, this *Antiministry Hypothesis* appears meerly whimsical; and since, supposing it true, falls infinitely short of accounting for the Phænomena in Dispute, the Difficulty still recurs, what was the Cause, or was there any given by the *Principals* of the *Hanover Allies*, sufficiently to justify the threatned ill Effects of those of *Vienna*? The projected Intermariages between *Spain* and *Vienna* might be occasion'd by the Provocation of *France* by sending back the *Infanta*; but what, but Schemes of exorbitant Power, could account for their Conduct towards the Court of *Great Britain*, and the *States of Holland*? What Cause was there for sending a Body of Troops of Twelve thousand Men to the Coasts of *Galicia* and *Biscay*, to make an Attempt upon his Majesty's Dominions? Why so considerable a Naval Force prepar'd by *Spain* against *England*, as Ships of seventy, sixty-four, fifty-six, twenty-six, and twenty-four Guns, and all victuall'd ready for Embarkation? Will the

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* *Treaty of Seville examin'd.*

Conduct of *Great Britain* at *Cambray*, or the Rejection of the Mediation, account for Designs against our Establishment? Remember the four thousand eight hundred Arms which were bought up in *Spain*, and destin'd to the Pretender's Service. Remember the *Russian* Men of War actually fitted out from *Petersburgh*, at the Expence of the Pretender's Friends, with the Privity of that Court, and sent to *Spain* to be employ'd in an Expedition for the Pretender's Service, and the many more that had been contracted for, and were design'd to follow? Can you, or any Man living, who gives his political Eyes fair Play, be dazled out of the Evidence we have for the Veracity of all this? Was not the Truth hereof confirm'd by Letters from the Pretender's Agents at *Petersburgh*, and others concern'd in these Transactions, which fell into the Hands of the Court of *Great Britain*? And was it not confirm'd again by the Vigilance of his Majesty's Officers at *Ireland*, who when these Ships were driven thither by stress of Weather, found all Symptoms of Enmity to his Majesty, and all Tokens of a warlike Design, and all Fears of Discovery, that could shew themselves? And upon the Arrival of these Ships in *Spain*, was it not written from the Court of *Russia* to *Stockholm*, to influence the *Swedes*, "that the Alliance of *Britain* and *France* would be of less Moment; since the Imperial Court, and the Pretender's Measures in *Spain*, would now find those two Powers full Employment*?" In short, Sir, the *British* Court had positive Intelligence, Intelligence from all the Friends of *Great Britain*, at almost every Court in *Europe*, that one express Article of the *Vienna Alliance*, contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt for him in Eng-

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* Enquiry.

land, before opening the War in any other Parts. And by as undoubted Intelligence it was added, that the *Pretender*, in Return, had oblig'd himself to restore *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon* to the Crown of *Spain*; to be *Guarantee* of the Emperor's *Ostend Trade*; and lay open the Commerce in our Plantations abroad to their Ships, with the same Privileges as the *English* themselves enjoy. To corroborate this Evidence, we had undoubted Assurances of the frequent Audiences at this Juncture, the late *Duke of Ormond*, and *Cannock*, the *Pretender's Minister* at *Madrid*, had with *Ripperda* and the Court of *Spain*, as well as those the *Duke of Wharton* had receiv'd, with a direct Commission from the *Pretender*, adorn'd with a Garter, and a new Title, as a publick Mark of Confidence. But all this Series of Facts and Evidence, it seems is to be overthrown, by our Author's following pretty Jingle of Words; as *Wharton's Rambles*, *Ripperda's Chit-Chat*, *Hear-says of what one great Man writ, concerning what another great Man said*; *three Muscovite Ships coming to Spain*; *Embarkations which were never made, and Armies which were never assembled**. And to support all this, we have in the next Page, the following notable Argument, "that there has since been no Attempt, nor any Appearance of an Attempt in Favour of the *Pretender*†." So ridiculous is this, that sure the gravest Man can't preserve his Temper; but must burst out into a fit of Laughter! What, Because the *Ministry* would not be laugh'd out of that Care and Watchfulness, which their King and Country requir'd of them, but took such vigorous Resolutions, and made such Preparations and Dispositions, that it was in vain for them to hope for any Success at that Time from such an At-
tempt;

* *Politics on both Sides*, Pag. 14.

† *Ibid.* Pag. 15.

tempt ; therefore these Men very logically conclude there was no such Attempt projected ! With the like Reason might I argue, that because our ever memorable *Minister* B. was happily frustrated in his darling Schemes to establish the same Interest, and plant Slavery among us, therefore truly no such Design ever enter'd his righteous Breast ! Was I dispos'd to be merry with those Triflers, I might prove by their way of Reasoning, that because the *Ministry* in Being absolutely defeated the Design of the modern Opposition in their late Scheme to establish a *military* Tyranny in these Kingdoms, therefore there was never any such Attempt, though it is now fresh in every ones Memory ! But it is a Maxim with those *Gentlemen* never to believe their Country in Danger till they behold the Enemy thundring at the Gates of our City, every thing thrown into Convulsions and a Chaos, and our Nation the Havock of Armies, and the Field of Battel. Why otherwise so much Venom and Malignity shewn at those early Precautions and Preparations, which averted the impending Storm ?

But why all this Pains to smother every Attempt in Favour of the *Pretender* ? As true as it is that this Creature may, when the Designs of *Statesmen* require it, be made a politick Scarecrow ; so true is it that his *Devotees*, when their Projects require it, may darken and overshadow, if not totally eclipse, the most glaring Efforts to impose their *Idol* upon us. No Jacobitical Partizan could throw a more artful Veil over their Schemes than our Patriots have done over the late ones of the *Vienna* Allies. Is it chimerical then to suggest this Treaty to be of their own hatching ? Is it unnatural to suppose the Projector of the *Utrecht Treaty* to have a Hand in its Offspring, that of *Vienna* ? You can't but observe, Sir, how these Gentlemen have been puzzled to account for this *Treaty* ; how they have labour'd to stifle all

Evidence which discover'd the *Pretender's* Interest at the bottom ; why then might not they themselves be the original Parent ? This sure is a more natural Cause than any that has ever yet been ascrib'd ; and they who are so industrious to distract us at Home, can you think would scruple to do the same from Abroad ? We know they have boasted of their Correspondence with foreign States, their Cabals with foreign Ministers, and being admitted into the *Cabinets* of all the *Princes of Europe** ; why then might they not carry on a criminal Correspondence with *Ripperda*, *Wharton*, and *Graham*, at this time ? If these *Gentlemen* were not the first Advisers, Projectors, and Formers of that *Treaty*, purposely to distress the *Ministry*, we may say, and without the least Injury to their Characters, that the Consequences of their Conduct prompted and encourag'd our Enemies to so daring an Enterprize. Before these *Patriots* display'd themselves in our Hemisphere, the Kingdom enjoy'd a perfect Calm, the People were without Divisions among themselves, as also without Alarms from other Nations ; Liberty, as now, was uninvaded, Property sacred, and Justice administered with the most equal Hand. No sooner did they break forth, but the Face of Things, both at Home and Abroad, was chang'd. From false Fears and Jealousies they made the People weary of their own Ease, and dissatisfy'd with the most equal Protection. They improv'd every Accident against the Publick Tranquillity, anticipated every Evil that threaten'd the State with Disturbance, reviv'd Parties when they began to be reconcil'd, and sow'd Discord where Harmony began to reign. When this Spirit is conjur'd up at Home, will not our Neighbours project Chains for us Abroad ! When thus our Enemies were rous'd to destroy us, our

Patriots

* *Dedication to the Craftsman, Vol. 1. p. 19.*

Patriots would have lull'd us asleep with Opiates of Security.

Maugre all such Attempts to deceive their Country, the direct View of the *British* Councils was to fortify our selves against the impending Danger, and call to our Assistance those Powers whose Inclination and Interest it was to help us. Thus was the *Counter-Alliance* of *Hanover* projected. But had we adopted the Tenets of those out of Power, we should have had no occasion for any *Alliance*; for they told us, that Nature having separated us from the Continent, renders us self-sufficient and independent; a Position, which, as long as we are a Trading Island, is big with Absurdity and Nonsense, and will pass on none but a hot-headed Rabble, poison'd with Flattery, and infected with Thoughts of Independency of the Universe.

Regardless of such Frenzies, the *Hanover Allies* soon convinc'd their Enemies that *England* and *Holland* were neither destitute of Friends, exhausted by former Wars, nor to be intimidated into any Measures to their Detriment. The *French*, who acceded to this Alliance, augmented their whole Army to about 160,000 Men; they had likewise fill'd their Magazines, and provided Artillery and all Sorts of Ammunition ready for taking the Field; they had also got a disciplin'd Militia of about 60,000 Men, and they fitted out for the Service of that Year 12 Men of War. Can we suppose that *France* would thus chearfully have put themselves to such expensive Preparations, and continu'd so faithful to their Allies as they did, had they not the strongest Assurance that their Interests were deeply struck at, as well as those of the House of *Hanover*?

The *Dutch* also, from their Accession to the *Hanover Treaty*, had increas'd their Forces from about 30,000 to above 50,000 Men; an Augmentation of about 20,000 beyond what they had in time of Peace;

Peace; they likewise made Preparations to fit out 18 Men of War. The Quota of *Sweden*, by virtue of their Treaty, was 5000 Men; and they were also to have ready on Demand 10,000 Men more, in Consideration of a Subsidy to be paid for three Years, not by *England* alone, but by *France* and *England*. By the Convention of *Denmark*, that Crown was to provide a Body of 24000 Men, to be reinforce'd with 6000 more, for a Subsidy to be paid by *France* alone. After these great Preparations of our Allies, what Conduct could in Reason be expected from *Britain*, whose greatest Interests were endanger'd? We increas'd our Land Forces from about 18000 to about 26,000 Men; which was an Augmentation of about 8000 Men only. The *Parliament* likewise, for this Year's Service, voted 20,000 Seamen; which computed into the Service of the preceeding Year, when only 10,000 Men were voted, tho' more were employ'd, may be reckon'd that we employ'd 5000 more Seamen each Year than in time of Peace. Besides these Land and Sea Forces, the 12000 *Hessians* were taken into our Pay. And now judge, *Sir*, whether these Preparations were more than a Contingent proportionate to those of the rest of our Allies engag'd in the same Cause?

The *Emperor*, resolute to prosecute his Designs, in Conjunction with *Spain*, augmented his Forces by Recruits, or additional Troops, to between Thirty and forty thousand Men, which made his whole Number Two hundred thousand. By the Treaty he made with the *Electors* of *Bavaria*, *Palatine*, *Cologne* and *Treves*, and other *Princes* of the Empire, he had secur'd to his Service Twenty-seven thousand Men; and by the Alliance with the *Czarina* Thirty thousand. He likewise found Means to detach the King of *Prussia* from the *Hanover Alliance*, and engage him in his Interest with an Army of Twenty thousand Men. The Forces
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of *Spain* might be reckon'd to be about Sixty thousand Men, besides their Naval Power. Will you believe now that the Treaty of *Vienna* was only an imaginary Scarecrow? Can you believe that a *Ministry*, who have been charg'd with using all Arts to keep off a War, would, without any Provocation, have precipitated a War? I blush at such shameful Inconsistencies, with which our Writers abound. Before we put our selves into a Posture of Defence, and shew'd the *British* Spirit of Resentment Sword in Hand, the new Allies never would submit to expostulate. But no sooner had the *Hanover* Allies form'd their Plan of Operations, but Insinuations were made to 'em of an Accommodation. They, ready to listen to honourable and pacifick Proposals, fram'd a Plan of *Preliminaries*, which pay'd the way to a Dissolution of the formidable Alliance, and put a stop to Hostilities in *Europe*. No sooner were those *Preliminaries* sign'd, and the Honour and Safeguard of our Country secur'd, but Three thousand four hundred twenty eight Men were sent back to *Ireland*, while the Allies still kept on Foot the same Number of Forces they had first rais'd.

While the Nation was in this armed and expensive Posture, negotiating, to prevent the Danger which threatned us, we heard nothing but Satires upon *French Faith*, and *French Perfidy*, *blundering Ministers*, and *blundering Treaties*. But did not the Event confront all this declamatory Fustian, and justify the Alliance with that Crown beyond all Contradiction? It was urg'd, that the natural and unalterable Opposition of Interests between the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, naturally led us to unite with *France*; that from such a Union 'twas reasonable to suppose the Parties confederated against us, would be induc'd, or compell'd to de-

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sist from their high Pretensions; and as it was argu'd, so it actually prov'd. 'Tis true, the former perfidious Conduct of that Court, and their open Violation of *Treaties*, has made the *French* Faith to be represented in the same Light that the *Punick* was of Old. But let it never be forgot, that the more treacherous and crafty that Court heretofore has prov'd to *Britain*; the more their rank and *constitutional Hatred*, as it has been call'd, was shew'd to this Kingdom, and the more former *Ministers* have been bubbled by them, certainly the more Honour is due to those, whose Address and Skill at Negotiation have prevented those Impositions, which were once so common.

Does not this Fidelity of *France* likewise justify the formidable Apprehensions we had from the Treaty of *Vienna*? For had not their Interest been struck at as well as ours, could we expect that any *Treaty*, *Convention* or *Alliance*, however formal or solemn, would bind them? From the Politicks of the *Ministry*, every *Phænomenon* is accounted for; from those of their Adversaries, every Thing appears unnatural and irreconcilable! Judge then who are the *Blunderers*, who the true *Masters* of Negotiation.

If *France*, by her Engagements, hop'd to make a Property of us, 'tis she deceiv'd her self, not we, who never were, as we never intended, implicitly directed by her Councils, or instrumental to the Increase of her Power. We were confidently told, by those who look with Envy on the Effects of this Alliance, that we lost the holding of the *Balance* through the Course of this Negotiation. Must not this be lying in the Face of the Sun, when Success attended those Parties whose Interest *Great Britain* espous'd? And what other

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Characteristick have we of holding the Balance?

But why this Rancor against our Alliance with *France*, at so seasonable a Conjuncture? Was not this designedly to break in Pieces the *Hanover Alliance*, and to wrest that Balance of Power really out of our Hands, for which they would be thought to contend? *Holland*, we know, is a natural Ally of *England*; but will they ever forget that Treatment they receiv'd from the *Utrecht Peace-Makers*? They suffer'd too much by their Fidelity and Attachment to *England* in the last War, to be very forward to engage in a new one for our Sakes. Had we not ally'd with *France* at this Time, would *Holland* have ventur'd to have enter'd into an Alliance with us, unsupported by *France*? Much less could we have hop'd for the Accession of *Sweden*, which if they had not been with us, must in Submission to the Power of the *Muscovite*, have join'd against us. Can we be sure that *France* would have stood neuter in the mean time? Is it not more likely they would by valuable Offers have been tempted to accede to the Treaty of *Vienna*, than it was that the *Emperor* should fall into so close a Union with *Spain*? Would not the Protestant Interest, upon such a League of the three great *Roman* Catholick Powers have been in the utmost Danger? Suppose, however, *France* had stood Neuter, and drew to themselves all the Trade of the World, while the other *European* Powers were wasting one another by a destructive War, would this have been a desirable Situation of Affairs? An Alliance therefore with *France* was not only necessary, but advantageous; it procur'd the Accession of *Holland*, and in Conjunction with other Measures, gave Encouragement to our Friends in *Sweden*, who, without our Help, saw themselves upon the
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brink of *Ruin*, either by submitting to the *Muscovite*, or daring to oppose them*.

Those *Weaklings* who were dup'd by *France*, would persuade us that the present *Ministry* have had the same Fate. But *Facts* and *Effects*, without many Words, shew the Impudent Falshood of this. Is any thing more ridiculous than to suggest, as these *Gentlemen* have, that what were wrong Politicks at one Time, cannot be right at another? Deprive these Men of their universal Precepts, and general Maxims, you deprive 'em of their *Compass* and *Pole-Star*. How mistaken are these great Men to imagine that *Statesmen* are to be bred as School-Boys are to make Nonsense Verses! May we not as well hope to make a good *Painter* or *Musician* extempore, by a Lecture in the Art of *Musick* or *Painting*, as a good *Politician* by *Rules*? He certainly is the greatest *Statesman*, who with Judgment squares general Rules to particular Cases, and times them happily. " 'Tis not the *Emperor*, nor *France*, says a great " Writer, nor this, nor the other Potentate, to " whom we must keep up a perpetual Opposi- " tion, or grant a constant Assistance. Power " will always be fluctuating among the Princes " of *Europe*; and whenever the present Flow of it " appears (especially in open and direct Violation " of our Rights) there is our Enemy, there the " proper Object of our Fears. And I cannot " think our having once lent a Hand to raise the " *Emperor*, is any Argument why we should suf- " fer him to climb what Heights he pleases, at the " Expence, and upon the Ruins of this Nation: " The same Policy that suggested the one, ju- " stifies our putting a stop to the other; and that " we may be able to set some Bounds to his Ac- " quisitions, if we can't to his Ambition†." This

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* *Treaty of Seville examin'd.*

† *An Answer to the Occasional Writer.*

is not temporary Party Politicks, but of equal Duration with the Laws of Reason whereon they are founded. This Sentiment will ever be preservative of the Balance of Power, the opposite inevitably destructive of it, and therefore, I fear, it has been so vehemently inculcated.

And truly every Branch of Politicks of the Opposition appears to be contriv'd with the same View. For what could have been the natural Consequence of either not taking the *Hessian Troops* into our Pay, or discharging them when taken, before the Peace of *Europe* was establish'd? Had we rais'd no Troops, except those in *England*, we should neither have had an Equivalent to our own *Allies*; nor a suitable Disposition of them to strengthen our mutual Interest. Our *Allies* and the *Dutch* in particular, were too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Seas, and the Difficulties and Delays which attend the transporting great Bodies of Troops, to depend upon such Helps, in a Case, which, if it happen'd at all, would be sudden, and too quick to be withstood by slow Movements. These Apprehensions made it necessary to have foreign Troops properly situated; and the having them was the only Thing that enabled his *Britannick Majesty* to do Justice to his *Allies* on this Occasion, by promising the *Dutch* that 12,000 *Hessians* taken into his Pay, should march, in Case of Need, to their Assistance; and the *French*, sensible of the Necessity of this, agreed to have as many of their *Swiss Troops* on the Side of *Flanders*, for the very same Service. If the *Dutch* were our proper and natural Ally, was it impolitic thus to protect them, when, by their Situation, they were more immediately expos'd to the Forces of the *Imperial Garisons* in the *Low-Countries* on one Side, and to the Forces of the *King of Prussia* on the other? Had not the *Dutch* judg'd those Troops more conveniently situated for their Assistance than *British* Troops; can we suppose

they would either have insisted on them, or accepted them as our *Quota*? Nay, can we suppose they would have accepted them at all, if they had the least Apprehension, as was most ridiculously insinuated *, that the Laws of the *Empire* would restrain these Troops, the *Landgrave* of *Hesse Cassel* being a Member of the *Germanick Body*, from making a Diversion against the *Emperor*? What Dupes would such Men at one Time make of the *States of Holland*, while at another they extol their Conduct, when it serves to depreciate that of their own Country?

As these *Gentlemen* see Things in a different Light from that of all the World besides, we need not marvel, that they should so industriously insinuate that these *Hessians* were neither hired, or continued in our Pay for the Sake of *Great Britain*, but merely on Account of Pretensions and Possessions belonging to *Hanover*. Unluckily for this *Antihanoverian* Suggestion, they have never been able to produce one Reason or Fact, during the Negotiations and Transactions of so many Years, to shew the Probability of such an Imputation; nor had one Word pass'd for some Years before the *Vienna Treaty* about *Bremen* or *Vehrden*; nor at the same Time of making that Treaty, had the late King, as Elector, or his present Majesty, in any Quality, the least Difference or Dispute about any Possession, with any Prince or State whatsoever.

True it is indeed, that after the Conclusion of the *Vienna Treaty*, and that his late, and present Majesty, resolutely supported the Honour and Interest of the *British* Crown and Nation, and would not make them subservient to the ambitious Views of other Persons; and that the *Emperor* could not find that Submission from the King of
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* *Craftsman*, Vol. VI. Pag. 320.

England, which he expected from an *Electoral* ; Designs were formed against his Electoral Rights and Dominions, upon Points in Appearance of no great Consequence to the *Alliance* then subsisting, or to the Affairs of *Europe* : And therefore form'd with this artful View, only to put his Majesty under a Necessity (which every good Prince must be under in the same Circumstances) to consult the Preservation of his *Hanover* Dominions ; and from the Measures taken for that Purpose, to raise Jealousies in the People of *England*, that the Quarrel was purely Electoral, and that *England* ought to be no wise concern'd in it.

His Majesty however resolved, notwithstanding any Menaces or Danger that threaten'd him as Electoral of *Hanover*, not to give up the Interest of *England* ; and the *Parliament*, being convinc'd that whatever he should suffer in his *Electoral* Capacity, must be the Effect of Resentment for his Majesty's steady Adherence to the Good and Honour of this Nation, came to the following Resolution :

That in Justice, and Vindication of the Honour of the British Crown, they would effectually stand by and support his Majesty against all Insults and Attacks that any Prince, in Resentment of the just Measures which his Majesty had so wisely taken, should make upon any of his Majesty's Dominions, tho' not belonging to the Crown of Great Britain.

A Resolution founded upon the Rules of common Justice and mutual Defence ; for if the *States-General*, *Sweden* or *Denmark*, who by Accession or Convention were engag'd with the *Hanover Allies*, had been attack'd by any of the Confederates of the *Vienna Treaty*, the rest of the *Hanover Allies* would have been oblig'd to have been concern'd in the Defence of their Friends so attack'd : *England* and *France*, and each of the *Allies* on each Side, must have look'd upon it as a common Cause ; and it
would

would be most absurd to suppose that the *Parliament of Great Britain* would not consent to defend the foreign Dominions of their own Sovereign, as well as those of *Sweden* or *Denmark*, if those Dominions were to have been attack'd on account of their being engag'd in Support of the Interests of *Great Britain*; and still more unaccountable it would be, if the *King* should not, in the Quality of *Electer*, find the same Assistance from the *British* Nation, as he would be sure of having if he were *Electer* only, and not *King*. And if we will but consider the *Electorate of Hanover* as an *Ally* of *Great Britain*, under the Engagements of mutual Guarantees, like any other Sovereign State of the Empire, this Question is at an end; unless we vainly imagine that we may lay down such preposterous Rules betwixt our selves and other Nations, that our Cause shall on all Occasions be theirs, and that their Cause shall never be ours.* I would ask these Gentlemen, who have clamour'd so loudly about *Hessian Troops* and *Hanover* Dominions; what would be the difference, if Hostilities were begun in *Hanover*, or in any other Part of the World, in Alliance with us? Would not this equally be the beginning of a general War, and involve *Europe* equally in all the dreadful Consequences of such a War? Are we not then equally oblig'd both in Honour and Prudence to prevent a War's being kindled there, as in any other Part of *Europe* in Alliance with us? And are we not engag'd to repel and resent any Injuries, Insults or Hostilities begun and committed there? Shall we say the *Electer of Hanover* is the only Prince in *Europe* that is not to be regarded and supported as an *Ally*? And that the *King's German* Dominions are the only Country that is to be expos'd to the common Fate of a Confederacy, and not to be entitled to the common Benefits of Security and Protection arising from the same

* *Considerations on the present State of Affairs. Printed for Roberts, 1730.*

same Obligations? There is no formal *Alliance* indeed subsisting between *Great Britain* and *Hanover*; for the Quality of *King* and *Electoꝛ* residing in the same Person, his Majesty could not contract with himself; but the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty are as strongly and necessarily imply'd, as the most formal *Treaties* and *Conventions* could make them.

Nor is this plain and natural way of Reasoning at all inconsistent with the Act of Settlement, as our *Anticonstitutionists* would make the Credulous believe. For tho' that has secur'd us from Danger and Expence of Wars, on account of Dominions not belonging to the Imperial Crown of these Kingdoms; yet that Act does not restrain us from adhering to the common Laws of Nations; it does not prohibit us from exercising the common Laws of Justice and Equity towards an *Ally*. Sure it does not tye us up from protecting those who are Sufferers by Quarrels merely *English*! Is it natural Justice and Humanity that the Subjects of *Hanover* should be destroy'd merely upon our Account, and that we should be forbid to succour them because they happen to have the same Sovereign with our selves?

But this was not the Case. The *Hessians* were taken into our Pay, for the Honour and Interest of the *King* and his *British* Dominions; and their Continuance was necessary to the general Pacification. Such therefore who wickedly wander from the Question, and harangue upon *Debts* and *Taxes*, on sending Money abroad to support foreign Forces and foreign Dominions at the Expence of this Nation, are guilty of the most impious and unjustifiable Practice; for it is representing a Matter of publick Consideration and publick Utility in the most invidious Light, as shall create the greatest Discontent and Dissatisfaction, where the greatest Veneration, Duty and Affection are due. * For, Had

* *Considerations on the present State of Affairs. Printed for Roberts, 1730.* •

Had the Doctrine of the Faction been follow'd, and the *Hessians* disbanded, the happy *Alliance* the King was engag'd in must have been dissolv'd, and our Allies at once discharg'd from all their Obligations to do us Justice, and secure to us all our Rights and Possessions, and Privileges of Commerce. Let us suppose the Parliament had refus'd to enable the King to make good his Engagements, and to have rais'd the Quota's and Proportions stipulated by the then Treaties, would not all Apprehensions been directly remov'd from the *Emperor*? Would not that *Alliance* have been dissolv'd, which alone could reduce him to Reason? Would not *France*, thus deserted by *England*, have enter'd into new Measures, and have thought no more of her Engagements with us? And would not the *States* of *Holland* have abandon'd their ancient and natural Ally, consulted their own Security, and not dar'd to have more provok'd the Resentment of the *Emperor*? What would then have become of the *Balance* of Power? Whose Politicks have preserv'd it, those of the *Ministry*, or those of their *Opposers*? Is there any *Englishman* will say he had rather the World should have been thrown into this Confusion, than that the *Hessian Troops* should have been continu'd till the Completion of the general Tranquillity? How could we have preserv'd *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mabon*, or got *Dunkirk* demolish'd? How could we have humbled the *Spaniard*, or procur'd the Abolition of the *Ostend* Trade, when we had cancell'd all our Obligations to Treaties, to humour a Faction, who would triumph in the Calamities of their Country? Could we expect that *France* and *Holland* should with their Power and Strength have supported our Advantages? Advantages too which they naturally envy our having, while we appear'd destitute of Strength and Power to support them our selves?

And indeed it would have been a most dishonourable and unjust Part with respect to our *Allies*, as well as the weakest with respect to our own Interest, if we had offer'd to make any great Diminution either of the Number of domestick or foreign Troops in our Pay, at the time that our Adversaries kept up them; and our *Allies*, *France* and *Holland*, theirs; the former their additional Forces of 30,000 regular Troops and 60,000 Militia, and the latter continu'd 20,000 Men more than they had before the Troubles began; an Expence which doubtless they would have been glad to be rid of, as soon as their own Safety and their Engagements towards their *Allies* would permit. The Conduct of *Great Britain* therefore is justified from that of its *Allies*, as well as from that of its *Enemies*; and *Anti-nessian Politicks* prov'd to be calculated to that wise End, the Underminers of the present Government have uniformly had in view, *the Destruction of the Protestant Balance of Power in Europe, in order to transfer it securely into other Hands.*

That every Branch of their Politicks terminates in this Point, and tends to make good this Accusation, you will easily observe from every material Topick of Debate. What else, Sir, could be the inevitable Effect of sending no Fleets, as was so strenuously recommended, to defeat the dangerous Measures taken in Consequence of the Treaty of *Vienna*? Does not this discover a determin'd Resolution to support the *Vienna Allies* against those of *Hanover*? Had a Squadron not been sent to the *Baltick*, would the *Northern Crowns* have been able to cope with that Power of the *Muscovite*, rais'd to support the *Vienna Treaty*? Would not *Sweden*, if not assisted by *England*, have been forced to submit to *Russia*, and receive Law from that Crown, through an absolute Impossibility of making Head against it? What could *Denmark* have done, had

this been the Event? Would not the *Muscovite* have had the Command of the *Sound* as well as of the *Baltick*? Would not the *Baltick Trade* from that Time have become precarious, and absolutely at the Mercy of that Court, to impose what Duties they pleas'd upon our *Merchants*, and lay them under what Restrictions and Prohibitions they should think most advantageous to their own, and prejudicial to our Commerce? Behold these doughty Advocates for Trade! When once Masters of the *Sound*, and of *Ports* open the greatest Part of the Year, should we not have found them riding triumphant in the Ocean, ready to join the *Emperor*, or *Spain*, or any other Power at Variance with us? Could we have hop'd for the Accession of *Sweden* to our *Alliance*, without this Fleet? The *Russians* at that Time had a large Squadron at Sea, with which they were plundering and ravaging their Coasts, and at the same Time a numerous Army by Land. So that had the *Swedes* not been with us, in Submission to the Power of the *Muscovite*, they must have join'd against us. But did not the News of our fitting out a Squadron for the *Baltick* have so good an Effect, that before Sir Charles Wager had arriv'd at *Stockholm*, they had concluded a Peace with *Sweden* upon reasonable Terms*. But the Fright the poor People were in upon all Parts of that Coast, and the Joy they express'd upon seeing our Fleet, was a plain Demonstration of the Danger they thought themselves in†. But here lies the low Fallacy of all our superlative Criticks have said against this Measure. They affirm that the *Swedes* had made Peace with the *Muscovites* before our Fleet was fitted out‡, when the Truth is, that the Peace was consequent

* *Treaty of Seville, examin'd. Printed for Roberts, 1730.*

† *Sir Charles Wager's Speech.*

‡ *Craftsman*, Vol. VI. Pag. 66.

sequent, and not antecedent thereto; and therefore, had this Squadron not been sent, we have no Room to doubt, that instead of a Peace, there would have certainly been a War fatal to the Powers of the *North*; for the Court of *Sweden* were assur'd, and it was the general Opinion of all *Foreigners* residing in *Russia*, that the real View of the *Czarina* was to go with a Fleet directly to *Stockholm*, and under Pretence of demanding the Use of their Ports, and the Assistance of *Sweden* for the Recovery of *Sleswick* to the Duke of *Holslein*, actually to dethrone the *King*, and make that Nation dependant on *Muscovy* *. Can we doubt a Moment then, whose Politicks preserv'd the Balance of the *North*, and whose were calculated to destroy it? Had it been once lost in the *North*, could it have been preserv'd in *Europe*?

Nor has the Squadron sent to the *West Indies*, escap'd the Censure of our Cavillers; but that Measure has been justified with the greatest Wisdom, and ridicul'd with the greatest Dulcness. Had not that an Effect equally happy and prosperous with the other? If Money is the Sinew of War; without which no great Enterprize can be attempted with any Prospect of Success, was it impolitick to stop up the *Spaniard's* Fountain of Riches, and for a time, as it were, to sever the *Indies* from that Kingdom? Were not our *Ministers* sensible at that time of the low Condition of the *Spanish Finances*, that neither their Civil List were paid, and that they borrow'd Money at high Interest, and yet were engag'd to make large Remittances to the *Emperor*? If therefore we could prevent the Return of the *Galleons*, was it possible for our Enemies to begin a War, as they intended? With this View a Squadron was sent to the *West-Indies*, and the *Gal-*

* Enquiry.

leons block'd up accordingly ; and did not the Event answer the End intended ? The *Spaniards*, disappointed in their first Heat, began to grow sick of their *Treaty* with the *Emperor*, and feel how prejudicial it was to their national Interest, not only to let the *Emperor* into the *West-India* Trade upon the most advantageous Terms, but to give him such large Subsidies to help them to recover *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* ; when the utmost the *Emperor* could have done in Service to the *Spaniards*, in those Respects, was by a Diversion.* Nor even this could he make, for want of Money, and Money he could not have till the Return of the *Galleons*, which our Fleets happily prevented, suspended a War, and plain'd the Way to a Pacification. But successful Events are ascrib'd to Chance and good Fortune ; unsuccessful to Folly or Design. Such Weather-cocks are these Gentlemen, that what is their infallible Criterion at one time, is the Reverse at another ; Success is set forth as the contrary, if it is not obtain'd in their own bloody-minded way, by fighting the Battels of all the Powers of *Europe*.

However good this Policy might formerly be thought, the Effects have prov'd it sufficiently detrimental to these Kingdoms ; and therefore those who have had the Disposal of our Blood and our Treasure, have been more tender of our Interests, and let other Nations fight for themselves. Nor has our pacifick Forbearance fully'd the Glory of our Arms, but magnify'd the Wisdom of our Councils, by such Coolness, Address, and Procrastination, as, in my poor Judgment, is worthy of Posterity's Imitation. How does it appear that the old *English* Valour and Bravery have, by such Conduct, been render'd inglorious ? We have been told, falsely and impudently told, that the Hands of our naval Officers were ty'd up by strict and explicit Orders ;

* *The Treaty of Seville examin'd, printed for Roberts, 1730.*

Orders ; that they were commanded to bear tamely the greatest Insults and Ignominy, and were upon no Account whatever to take the Treasure of the *Spaniards*, or any way molest their Navigation.

But, Sir, if you will give your self the Trouble to enquire into the original Orders given to the several Commanders of our Squadrons at that time, you will find the direct contrary of what has been so wickedly represented ; nay, if you will please only to consult some disjointed Parts * of them that have been made publick, you will meet with a plenary Refutation of what has been insinuated upon that Matter to the Dishonour of your Country. What Injury have we suffer'd that we have not resent'd suitable to the Prowess of a brave and warlike People ?

The *Vienna* Allies, 'tis true, made bold Attempts upon our Trade and Navigation, and we as boldly resent'd it, by stopping up their Treasure, and sending a Fleet even to their very Coasts ; and had they not listen'd to the Voice of Reason in time, as sure as our Fleet was sent, so sure should we have bombard'd their Dominions, and convinc'd them that we were not dispos'd to make wanton and fruitless Expeditions, as we were not so infatuated as to be precipitated into fairy and fantastical Wars, without first trying the Effects of Negotiation.

As to the Orders, *Sir*, given to the Commanders of our Men of War, they were worthy of the Councils of *Great Britain*, being highly suitable to the Circumstances of Affairs ; they were calculated effectually to intercept or block up the *Galleons* and the *Flotilla*. And as the Orders prov'd successful with respect to the former, can we with any appearance of Reason believe them design'd otherwise with regard to the latter ? Throughout the whole *Instru-*
tions

* *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, printed for Roberts, 1729.*

Elions the *Flota* and *Galleons* are generally mention'd together, seldom separate ; in many Places the *Flota* are exprefs'd prior to the *Galleons*. Though both Fleets were thus united, to shew that the Orders were equally strict with regard to the one as the other, yet instead of this being taken in its natural and obvious Sense, our Criticks from thence have attempted to shew that the *Ministry* did not know they were two distinct *Fleets*, and that the one came from *Peru*, the other from *Mexico*. To what pitiful Shifts have these unhappy *Gentlemen* been reduc'd to support their Spirit of Confusion ! Did not the express Orders given to Admiral *Hosier* shew the Folly and Nothingness of this Objection ? Was he not order'd “ to look upon his Instructions to be “ the same with regard to the *Flota* expected from “ *Vera Cruz*, as with relation to the *Galleons* ? ” Is it not unquestionably evident from these very Words, that these *Fleets* were expected from different Places ? How then could they possibly be understood to be one and the same ? The Orders being the same with regard to the one as the other, could in no wise be meant to relate to any Place of Interception, but that which both *Fleets* should meet at. And therefore it is we find Admiral *Hosier* was order'd to go directly to *Cartagena* to meet the *Galleons* ; and if they should be gone from thence, he was to follow them to *Porto-Bello*, and from thence to the *Havana* ; and there, at the *Havana*, to intercept the *Flota* from *Mexico* ; having the same strict Regard to them that he was order'd to have towards the *Galleons*. But in case it should so happen that they escap'd him in the *West-Indies*, or the Treasure should have been put on board other Ships (of which Design his *Britannick Majesty* had Intelligence) in order to be privately and securely carry'd to *Spain*, he [*Hosier*] was order'd “ to sail immediately in pursuit of such *Galleons*, *Flota*, or *Ships* : “ and

“ and if he could not come up with them, he was
 “ likewise order’d to make the best of his way to
 “ the Cape St. *Vincent* on the Coast of *Portugal*.” If
 he met with no Intelligence of the *Galleons*, *Flota*,
 or *Ships*, upon his Arrival on that Coast, he was
 “ to keep cruizing to the Southward of the said
 “ Cape, in order to intercept them, and to expect
 “ Ships to join him with Intelligence of them, or
 “ with his Majesty’s further Orders.”

Admiral *Hofier* however block’d up the *Galleons* at
Porto Bello ; and, as appears by a Letter from him
 from the *Bastimentos*, to one of his Majesty’s Principal
 Secretaries of State, took all imaginary Precau-
 tion to prevent any Money being shipp’d off, as
 intended ; and his Success was as great as his In-
 structions were strong and peremptory, under Pain
 of his Majesty’s highest Displeasure. As these
 were the real Orders given to that able Officer, can
 you believe that any Care was wanting, on
 the Part of the Government, to prevent the Re-
 turn of the *Flota*, as well as of the *Galleons* ? The
 same Admiral had likewise direct and positive Orders
 “ to protect the Trade of his Majesty’s Subjects,
 “ and to make *Reprisals* on the *Spaniards* for any
 “ Injuries that should be done them by the *Spanish*
 “ *Garda Costas*, or otherwise.” And in Case he
 received, during his Stay in the *West-Indies*, a certain
 Account that the *Spaniards* had seiz’d the Effects
 of the *South-Sea* Company, or other his Majesty’s
 Subjects in any of their Colonies, he was directly
 and positively commanded “ to use his best Endeav-
 “ ours to recover the same, or to make *Repri-*
 “ *sals* ; and to assist in the best manner he could,
 “ the said Company, or their Agents, or his Ma-
 “ jesty’s Subjects, if to prevent such Seizure, they
 “ should apply to him for his Assistance in with-
 “ drawing such Effects out of the Power of the
 “ *Spaniards*.” Upon the *Spaniards* having laid
 r Siege

Siege to *Gibraltar*, he was directed by the Lords of the *Admiralty*, in Pursuance of his Majesty's Pleasure signify'd to them, " To give Orders to the " respective *Captains* under his Command, to take, " sink, burn, or otherwise destroy any *Ships*, or *Vessels*, belonging to the King of *Spain*, or his *Sub-jects*, which they could come up with." These were a Part of the Orders given to *Admiral Hosier*; and should I not trespass too much on your Patience, I could transcribe many more Passages of those Orders, which discover the true *English Spirit*, under the Direction of the coolest Judgment; and not that servile, base, and ignoble one, the turbulent and disaffected have trumpeted through the Nation. Where then are these Spaniel Lessons of Passivity under *Spanish* Insults? Were not the Orders given to *Vice-Admiral Hopson*, *Sir John Jennings*, and *Sir Charles Wager*, of the same *British* Complexion with those given to *Admiral Hosier*? Though by Reason of the Number of *English* Ships constantly employ'd in the *Mediterranean* Trade, it unavoidably happen'd, from the *Spaniards* commencing Hostilities without any previous Declaration of War against us, that they took several of our *Merchant-Men* in those Parts, and upon the Coasts of *Spain*; yet what *Englishman*, of Candor and Integrity, will say, that *Sir Charles*, with his *Squadron*, or perhaps with the Aid of the whole *Fleet of England*, could have prevented the taking of those Ships? Let the Conduct of this *Gentleman* be ever so blameless, ever so much for the Honour of his Country, yet the *Snarlers* of our Day could not forbear indulging their little Rage and Petulancy against him, because he had not the good Fortune to prevent the Escape of the *Flotilla*. This *Gentleman*, however, had lately an Occasion of justifying himself, in a proper Place, and told the *Censurers*, " That if they

“ they knew the Place he was oblig’d to Cruize
 “ in for the intercepting of the *Flotilla*, and the
 “ great Seas that roll there in Winter-time, they
 “ would not have had Occasion for long Nights,
 “ and foggy Weather *, the sneering Reflection
 “ cast upon him in *Politicks on both Sides*, as a
 “ Reason for his having missed meeting with the
 “ *Flotilla* ; they would have known, said he, that
 “ at that Time of the Year, they might have pas-
 “ sed, even within his View, without its being in
 “ his Power either to come up with them, or to
 “ fire a Gun at them.” †

From the Orders and Instructions themselves,
 given to the several Admirals of our Fleet, it is
 sufficiently manifest, that the Councils of our *Prince*
 were never corrupted with the slavish Principles of
 Cowardice and Fear, nor poison’d with Lessons of
 the Omnipotence of our Arms. No Conduct ever
 tended more to the Glory of the *British* Nation
 than this ; none ever better supported the Dominion
 and Sovereignty of the Seas. This we have con-
 firm’d by a *Gentleman* well known to be no Friend
 to the present *Administration*, who says, in Ho-
 nour to this Kingdom, “ that we are now become
 “ so powerful by our Commerce, that we were
 “ able to send three Fleets at the same Time to
 “ three different and far distanc’d Parts of the
 “ Globe. One before *Gibraltar* ; a second to
 “ *Porto Bello*, to dispossess the King of *Spain* of
 “ the Treasures of the *West-Indies* ; and a third
 “ into the *Baltick*, to prevent the *Northern* Powers
 “ from coming to an Engagement. ||

Had the *Muscovite* Fleet prevail’d in the *North* ;
 had the *Emperor* obtain’d the Establishment of a
 Naval Power in the *South* ; had these *Maritime*

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 25.

† Sir Charles Wager’s *Speech*.

|| Voltaire’s *Letters of the English Nation*.

Powers join'd with that of *Spain* ; and lastly, had *England*, as the Enemies of our Prosperity advis'd, rejected the Alliance with *France*, and thereby added the Weight of their *Naval Strength* to that of our *Rivals*, would not the Naval Force of *Britain* have become as much the Scoff of *Europe*, as it is now the Terror ? Would not Posterity have found Historians lamenting the fatal *Æra*, when we lost the Sovereignty of the Seas, instead of magnifying that Conduct which has so wisely preserv'd it ? Our *Antiministers*, you know, *Sir*, have declaim'd warmly for upholding the Dominion of the Seas, while they have as warmly oppos'd our sending out any Fleet at all. Would not one unacquainted with the Talents of these Men, be apt to think they had made a new Discovery of maintaining the Dominions of the Seas, without the Aid of a Royal Navy ! Must we not have all imaginable Contempt for such wild Politicians ? What Pains have these Men taken ; what Rhetorick have they employ'd to impose upon the Trading Interest of this Kingdom ? They have aggravated the Misfortunes of some, drawn a Veil over the clandestine Practices of others, and all to raise themselves upon the Ruin of the greatest Friends to Trade, which I may take Occasion more fully to shew in a Paper by it self, on our *Domestick Affairs*. Our late uncertain Situation, 'tis true, did hurt our Trade, and enlarge our Expence : A Misfortune which our Neighbours and Allies, and even those engag'd against us, suffer'd as well as we. But would not the opposite Conduct, so vehemently recommended, have hurt our Trade infinitely more, and rais'd our Expence infinitely higher ? The Trading Interest have been alarm'd against the Administration, how justly, let the Orders and Instructions given to the Commanders of his Majesty's Squadrons, shew. Could the *Depredations*,
com-

committed by the *Spaniards* in the *West-Indies*, have been prevented by those able *Officers* who were station'd there? Do not the Orders referr'd to, indubitably evince, that they were not restrain'd from revenging any Insults upon their Country, by particular and explicit Instructions? Don't we find *Admiral Hosier*, in his very first Orders, directed to give the best Assistance he could to the *South-Sea* Company, and all other his Majesty's Subjects, for the preventing any Seizure of their Effects; or if they were seiz'd, to use his best Endeavours to recover them, or to make Reprials; and were not further Orders given upon the first Notice of the beginning of Hostilities by the *Spaniards*, to take or destroy their Ships, as in Time of an actual War? And did not he, and his Successors, continue under these Orders, to the Time of the Arrival in the *West-Indies*, of the Orders given reciprocally by his Majesty, and the King of *Spain*, for putting the *Preliminaries* in Execution?

No Man has a more sincere Regard to the Trading Interest than my self; nor can any one commiserate more those *Gentlemen*, whose private Fortunes may have been prejudic'd by National Quarrels. As I would by no Means make their Misfortunes less than they really were, so neither is it equitable to exaggerate them to a ten-fold Proportion. Their Sufferings, of late Years, are not a sufficient Load for the present Administration, therefore a List must be compos'd of every Vessel taken from the signing of the Peace of *Utrecht*, to the Conclusion of the late one, in Peace or War, by *Pirate*, or *Guarde de Costa*, fair *Trader*, or *Smugler*; and all must be plac'd to the Account of the present *Ministry*. But even dating these dreadful Depredations from that Period, so many Years before this *Ministry* were in Power, they never

amounted, as appear'd on the Examination in Parliament, at a Medium, to the Value of 5000 Pounds a Year; which if computed, with Relation to the *Jamaica* Trade, hath not been in twenty Years, twenty Shillings *per Cent.* upon that Trade; and in Relation to the private Commerce carried on with the *Spanish West-Indies*, it hath not amount'd to two and a half *per Cent.* upon the whole Value of that Trade: Yet as much Up-roar hath been made on this Subject, as if the whole Trading Interest of *Britain* had been sacrific'd, and all the *Merchants* made Bankrupts by these Depredations. For a Year after the Arrival of the Squadron in the *West-Indies*, not one Ship was complain'd of as taken from our Merchants by the *Spaniards*; and the whole Number of Ships taken from the Treaty of *Hanover*, to that of *Seville*, is but 26; and of those, six together amount to no more than 340 Tons, and one other was the Property of the Publick, being bound with Provisions for the Squadron. This is the long and black Catalogue of Ships taken from us by the *Spaniards*. But were these owing to any Misconduct in the *Ministry*? Have our Losses, since they have been in Power, exceeded those of former more peaceable Times? Cast your Eyes back upon the three last Years that immediately follow'd the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and authentick Testimony will shew you, that the Number of Ships taken in those Parts by the *Spaniards*, during those three Years of *full Peace*, is equal to what they have taken from us there since the Treaty of *Hanover*.* With what Honour and Conscience then, have the Trading Interest been irritated against those in Authority? Did the *Merchants* know how little anxious their double-fac'd Advocates are for the Reparation of their Losses,

* *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain.*

Losses, lest an End should be put to Clamour and Discontent, they would ever have had their Writings in that Detestation, I prophesy, they will shortly have them.

That these noisy Patrons of Trade were never so sincere as the *Ministry* have been to redress the Grievances of our suffering *Merchants*, is apparent; for when the *Ministry* labour'd that Point, they endeavour'd to shew, that the Privileges of the *Affiento* Trade had been forfeited by the fraudulent Methods of carrying it on, though at the same Time they had the most shocking Impudence to clamour about Depredations occasion'd thereby. Nay, to retard the Peace of *Europe*, and to prevent Reparations being made to our Merchants, they propagated that neither *France* nor *Holland* would, or could with Justice, support us in these Points; that *Friends* and *Enemies*, nay, all *Europe*, were against us in them. Thus, while they themselves were the most forward and instrumental to make us lose those valuable Rights of Trade, they were the most forward and loud to clamour at the Loss of them.

During this uncertain Situation of Affairs, was it our Fate to be the only Sufferers? Did not the *French* and the *Dutch* suffer Depredations at this Time as well as we? Tho' this can be no Alleviation of our Losses, yet it is sufficient to shew that those *Spanish* Insults were not particularly levell'd at *Britain*, by Reason of the Disposition her *Ministers* discovered for Peace rather than War. The Effects of the late Wars, *Sir*, are not yet wholly invisible, tho' under this *Administration* far from intolerable. The bravest *Prince* in the Circumstances of the present, will rather have Recourse to Negotiation, than set himself up for a Scourge to the whole World, to become a *Hero* of *Beggars* and *Slaves*. When Treaty, with the prudent Exertion of our Arms, will not keep ambitious Princes

Princes within Bounds, 'tis then, and then only Wars are justifiable. The Politicks of our warlike Statesmen would, by this time, have near doubled our National Debt, and thereby our Taxes. Would not this have render'd the Crown an insupportable Burthen to the Royal Offspring? *British Bravery*, 'tis true, might be extoll'd for a time, but Posterity of *Prince and People* would curse the Heroism of their Ancestors. Would War, as soon as Negotiation, have produc'd publick Tranquility? When the Sword is drawn, besides those who immediately engage, do not we see others from various Views and Instigations are drawn in on either Side; and what was at first only a Contest between two, comes at last to involve twenty? Thus Wars commenc'd in a Heat, have lasted many Years with incessant Rage, to the Ruin of whole Communities; when with the Disposition of an *English Ministry*, the whole might have been happily averted.

'Tis the Threadbare Stuff that every Fool catches at, that the *Ministry* have always dreaded a War, lest they themselves should suffer by it. But who does not see thro' the Absurdity of this Suggestion? The Guilt of *Ministers* have often hurry'd them on to War, that in the Tumult of Arms, and by diverting elsewhere the publick Attention, they might proceed in their Iniquities, and escape Examination, or at least postpone it. But to find *Ministers* solicitous to avoid a War, let me tell you, *Sir*, is no small Presumption of their Innocence. Was it not the Guilt of *Alcibiades*, as well as his Ambition, that prompted him to involve his Country in a War? And was it not his Advice to *Pericles*, to set a War on foot, thereby to avoid passing his Accounts with the publick? Did not *Cardinal Richieu* engage *France* in a War with *Spain*, purely for a selfish End of his own? Whatever the *Enemies* of the *Ministry* may in the Spirit of Calumny insinuate
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of their Corruption, nothing is more against the private Interest of *Ministers* than Peace. And were not we told this, partly by the same Men towards the latter End of the last just and necessary War, in innumerable Libels? Were not we then told, that War was the Harvest of *Ministers*? So that, are you for War? You destroy the Nation for your own private Gain. Are you for Peace? 'Tis sacrificing the Honour of the Nation to self-interested Views. Do the Lamentations of those Men over our *Debts* and *Taxes*, shew we are in a Condition to be fed with Points of Honour? Sure these Gentlemen are not weak enough to believe that the Honour of a Nation is to be considered like that of a proud and cholerick Man, who is soon affronted, and as soon draws his Sword. "Publick Honour always infers publick Interest and Security, says an ingenious Gentleman; and 'tis more prudent and profitable, and therefore more *Honourable* in a Nation, sometimes to put up a small Injury than to risk a greater to repair it." But how have these Gentlemen signalized themselves for the Honour of their King and Country? If indeed making us the *Quixots* of the World, stirring us up to fight to negotiate, and negotiate to fight again, as long as we are a State, be to our Honour, I must acknowledge no Men deserve more to be honoured by their Country. If War only be the Road to Honour, why have they so violently opposed every legal Improvement of the *Finances*? If nothing will please them but Fighting, why such Efforts to destroy *Publick Credit*? Was I dispos'd to declaim, or inveigh, I have an inexhaustible Fund of Matter for both. When *Gibraltar* was besieg'd, to the Honour of their Country they would have persuaded us to trust to *French Faith*, which they have so much expos'd, for its Preservation. They mightily complain'd that our *Allies* should suffer the Siege to be

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push'd on, without giving us any Succour of Men, Money, or Ships. * Was it that *France* were not ready to enter upon Action, at the Nod of the Court of *Great Britain*? This they won't say. While the *Emperor* lay quiet, and began no Hostilities, nor did *Spain* call them to their Aid; why should we call *France* to ours to involve all *Europe* in War? Besides, if *France* is naturally so perfidious, as never to be depended on; and if, as has been likewise said, they envy us that Fortification in particular, would it have been prudent to have rely'd on *French Sincerity* and *French Bravery*, for the Preservation of what they would be glad should be sever'd from the Crown of *England*?

This State of Inaction of our Allies on both Sides produc'd the Effect our *Ministers* foresaw: The Siege of *Gibraltar* was discontinu'd, a Set of *Preliminaries* agreed on, and ratify'd at *Vienna*. For the *Emperor* saw the inflexible Conduct of the *British Court*, would prevent the return of the *Galleons*, and disable him to carry on the War, and therefore was oblig'd to submit. At the *Spanish Court* Affairs took a different Turn. They paid too much Regard to the false Hopes they received from a *British* Faction of a Change of *Ministry* in *England*, and thereby of a Change of Measures more to their Interests. You can't forget, *Sir*, how sanguine the Faction were, full of Rhodomontade, and prophetick Vision, concerning the Downfal of the *Ministry*. *Spain* therefore instead of signing the *Preliminaries* made many Cavils and Quibbles to elude them. Our Patriots, at this time, left untry'd no Arts to prevent a Peace. They spared no Pains both at Home and Abroad to depretiate the Abilities of our *English Statesmen* in general, and set their Characters and Transactions in a ridiculous Light; they writ with the greatest Confidence, that such Men would
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* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 25.

come into Power, who would reverse the Conduct of *Great Britain*, and therefore instead of opposing her Enemies, play into their Hands. Is it strange then that these Hopes in the *Spaniards* should occasion trifling Delays and Procrastinations? Certain it is that *Statesmen* in all Times take their Measures not only from what is their direct Interest in general, but from the State of the several Nations they have to do with, and regulate their Conduct according to the Factions suppos'd to be a-foot among them. When the Faction pour'd out their Defamation against all in Power; when they not only condemn'd the Treaty of *Hanover* as *mischievous*, but represented that of *Vienna* as *advantageous*; when the *Ministry* that form'd the one, and oppos'd the other, were thus publickly arraign'd, and their Disgrace from time to time loudly proclaim'd, what could we expect, but that our Enemies would conceive Hopes that such a Change might give them an Opportunity of pursuing their Projects more at Ease? It cannot be Matter of Wonder therefore that they should make that Expectation their immediate Point in View, and shuffle and prevaricate instead of expedite the Negotiations.

Spain finding the Councils of *Britain* steady, and no Signs of a Change of *Ministry* to their Advantage, at length ratify'd the *Preliminaries* likewise; whereby an End was put to all Hostilities. Here our *blundering Ministers* disappointed the Enemies of their Country both at Home and Abroad. Provok'd at this great Advance towards a Pacification, our *Criticks* exerted all their Skill to mangle these *Preliminaries*; and accordingly entertain'd the Publick with a few jesuitical Distinctions; that a Cessation of Hostilities, as stipulated in the *Preliminaries*, did not imply an actual raising of the Siege; and that the Restitution of the Ship *Prince Frederick* was not included in them: They pretended likewise that

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the *Preliminaries* were made up of study'd Ambiguities, to conceal the true Intent of the Articles from common Observation; and that the *Spanish* Pretensions to *Gibraltar* were to be discuss'd and decided at the Congress; all which the Event prov'd to be false and seditious. Do not the express Words of the second Article of the *Preliminaries* say, "Rights, " or those Things which are possess'd by ANY of " the contracting Powers, by virtue of the Treaties " of *Utrecht* and *Baden*, and the *Quadruple Alliance*, " &c. shall remain untouch'd?"* Was not the Right to *Gibraltar* fix'd to *Great Britain* by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and confirm'd by the *Quadruple Alliance*? If so, is not signing the *Preliminary Articles*, which are absolutely built upon those *Treaties*, signing in effect the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and *Quadruple Alliance*? *Spain* therefore by having ratify'd this Article, once more not only confirm'd and allow'd the Right to *Gibraltar* to be in *Britain*, but consented that it should remain untouch'd. And in Confirmation of the Truth of this, was not the Blockade of *Gibraltar* rais'd? Here again the blundering Ministry disappointed their Enemies, engag'd his *Catholic Majesty* to give express Orders for restoring the Ship *Prince Frederick* with her Cargo to the Agents of the *South-Sea-Company*; and that the Effects of the *Flotilla* should be forthwith deliver'd to the respective Proprietors.

Need we look any further for the Cause of those Delays that preceded the first signing of the *Preliminaries*, or of those chicaning and frivolous Objections of the Court of *Spain*, when our Enemies at home put them into their Mouths? 'Tis no ways surprizing that our *Plenipotentiaries* found the Business of a general Peace impracticable by the Means of a general Congress; they might have continu'd negotiating ineffectually till this time, while our

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* *General Collection of Treaties.*

Enemies had it in their Power by Delays to increase those very Clamours, on which they founded their Hopes. Is this Patriotism, to defeat the Councils and distress the Affairs of their own Country? that Country whose Interest they pretended to espouse, and whose Difficulties they, *Crocodile-like*, wept over? The mischievous Tendency of such Behaviour, says an able Writer, “ is of so covert, and “ yet so effectual a nature, that I think I may assert, “ that had those *Men* transported their Estates to “ the Exchequers, and their Persons to the Councils and Armies of our Enemies, they would perhaps have been less detrimental to the Nation in “ that State of direct Hostility, than in this of “ seeming Patriotism.”

Never sure had *Ministers* more Difficulties to struggle with, nor ever were they so bravely encounter'd. The nearer the general Tranquillity drew to a Completion, the more enrag'd and malignant grew the Enemies of the *Ministry*. No sooner was the Congress open'd, and the Project of a *provisional Treaty* drawn by the *Hanover Allies*, which still had a natural and progressive Tendency to bring about the Pacification, but our *restless Party* began to pull that to pieces, as they had before done the *Preliminaries*; and indeed much to the same purpose. They pretended that *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* were not effectually secur'd to us; when by the second Article of that *Treaty* it is apparent that the *Treaties* of *Utrecht*, *Rastad* and *Baden*, the *Treaty* of the *Hague* in 1717, together with the *Quadruple Alliance*, and all *Treaties* and *Conventions* antecedent to 1725, the *Preliminary Articles*, and the *Convention* sign'd at the *Pardo*, are made the Basis and Foundation of the *Provisional Treaty*; and being confirm'd by it, whatever has been stipulated in our Favour in any of these *Treaties* and *Conventions*, receiv'd a new Sanction from this. If then these

Treaties and *Conventions* effectually secur'd to us our *Possessions* and *Privileges* of Trade, in all its Branches, both in *Europe* and in the *Indies*, did we not by the *Provisional Treaty* obtain a fresh Confirmation of our Right to all our Possessions, and to all our Privileges in Trade? Nay, we had this farther Advantage thereby, that in the Conclusion of the said second Article all the contracting Parties were severally engag'd, not only to abstain themselves, but likewise to oblige all others to abstain from doing any thing directly or indirectly in Violation of the *Provisional Treaty*, and those *Treaties* antecedent thereto. Was it possible therefore to provide more effectually for the Security of our *Possessions* and *Privileges* of Commerce than that Project actually did?

By this Article, and by the third and fifth, we are likewise effectually secur'd from all the dangerous Engagements contain'd in the publick or private *Treaties* of *Vienna*. For the second Article of that Treaty confirms expressly those very *Treaties*, by which the *Pretender* is solemnly disavow'd, and his Majesty's Title acknowledg'd and guarantee'd by the *Emperor* and the *King* of *Spain*. By the fifth Article the *Emperor* renounces all Pretensions to any Advantages in Matter of Trade, superior to what is granted by *Spain* to other Nations. Could therefore a solemn *Cassation* of the *Treaties* of *Vienna* have more effectually secur'd these our most important Interests than this Project did? The third Article was for such a Suspension of the *Ostend Trade*, as in effect amounted to an Abolition. The seventh Article was calculated to obtain Reparation for the Losses our Merchants have sustain'd. The general Pacification is of too great Consequence to be retarded by long and dilatory Discussions of Points of this nature, and therefore it was necessary to leave them to be determin'd by Persons conversant in commercial Affairs; for the various Documents
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and Memorials that are necessary to state these Matters in a true Light, and the Distance of Place and Time, create great Difficulties with regard to the Captures and Seizures, as well as to the several Proofs. But then it was by the ninth Article provided, that no Hostilities should be committed during this Discussion of Disputes; and this under the *Guaranty* of all the contracting Powers.

And now I will just give you a Relish of the extraordinary Objections that our great *Pretender's* to *Treaty-making* have entertain'd the Publick with upon this Project. "Supposing, say they, this *Treaty* leaves us upon the same Foot of former *Treaties*? Is it not well known that the Sense of "some of those *Treaties* hath been disputed? And "may they not be disputed again, and occasion the "same Disturbance?" † Is not this disputing the Sufficiency of the Treaty of *Utrecht* for that purpose? Nay, is it not disputing the Sufficiency of all *Treaties* in the Power of Man to make? 'Tis an Insult to your Understanding to dwell upon such wretched Stuff; it is best answer'd with Contempt. However trifling this, and many other Objections, where this is to be met with, may appear, they serv'd to keep up the Spirit they had rais'd at home and abroad; they serv'd, with other Expedients, to instigate the *Spaniard* to reiterate their chicaning and dilatory Artifices, to effectuate the Disgrace of that *Ministry*; who would never buckle to their Measures. But to prevent being any longer trifled with, and to cut off all unnecessary Delays, his Majesty thought proper to fit out a considerable Squadron, which was join'd by another of the *Dutch*; which Measure succeeded so well, that without stirring from our own Ports it had the Effect propos'd by it; it kept the *Spaniards* in awe, quicken'd the *Treaty* of *Seville*, and thereby brought about a safe

† *Craftsman*, Vol. IV. Pag. 242.

and honourable Peace. His Majesty's preferring an Alliance with *Spain*, is a strong Proof that the Interests of *Great Britain* have always had the chief place in his Thoughts. The Consideration of any Dangers to his *German* Territories made no Impression upon his Majesty; the Advantages accruing to this Nation in point of Trade and Commerce, were too obvious for him to hesitate a Moment in closing with *Spain*.

This *Treaty* answer'd all we could expect from a *Treaty*, and removes all Grievances which we before complain'd of: The whole of which is reducible to these two Points; the Violation of former *Treaties* with respect to our Commerce, and with respect to our Possessions. By the first Article of this *Treaty* all former *Treaties* and *Conventions* between the contracting Parties are renew'd and confirm'd, in the same Manner as if they were actually inserted at full length. If therefore our *Spanish Trade* was upon a good Foot before our unhappy Differences, it is upon a good Foot now, 'tis re-establish'd upon the very same *Treaties*. 'Tis the same likewise with Respect to our *Possessions*. If *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* were sufficiently secur'd to us by the *Treaty of Utrecht*, they are so still; since that *Treaty* is as fully re-establish'd in that Point as in any other; and whatever Title we had before to those Places, we have the same acknowledg'd still. * But this is not all: By the second Article the contracting Powers engage to guarantee reciprocally the Kingdoms, Places, and Dominions, under their Obedience, in what Parts of the World soever situate. So that we may defy our *Patriots*, or any Body else, to shew in what Manner those foreign *Acquisitions* can be more effectually secur'd. But the Enemies of the *Ministry* were not asham'd to insinuate, that there was a *Secret Article* behind, by which we have oblig'd our-

* *Treaty of Seville examin'd. Printed for Roberts, 1730.*

selves to give up *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*, at the End of three Years. The time is now expir'd, and the Wickedness of those Men therefore demonstrated, and the Truth of that open Declaration in Parliament of a great *Minister*, that *He knew of no such Article*, confirm'd.

By the second, our Possessions, and all our Privileges and Rights of Commerce, are guaranteed to us. By the fifth, Reparation is promised for the Damages suffer'd by the Subjects of *Great Britain* in *Europe*, since the Time prescrib'd by the Preliminaries, for the Cessation of Hostilities there; and in the *West-Indies*, since the Arrival of the King of *Spain's* Orders at *Cartagena*. The sixth Article declares, that all Ships and Effects taken at Sea, in *Europe*, to the Time prescrib'd by the Preliminaries for the Cessation of Hostilities; and in the *West-Indies*, till the Arrival of his Catholick Majesty's Orders at *Cartagena*; shall be referr'd to Commissaries, whose Decisions shall be punctually executed. And what other Method could possibly have been used, in a Case where there must of Necessity be so great a Variety of Pretensions, some of them of so long standing, and where the Distance of Place and Time alone must create great Difficulties, with regard to the Captures and Seizures, as well as to the several Proofs? If a better Way had been practis'd in former Times, or could have been suggested now, there is no Reason to think it would have been overlook'd. If all the Care be taken for Satisfaction that the Nature of the Case will admit of, there can be no room to find fault with the Treaty on this Account; we have all we can desire. And when what the *Commissaries* have done upon this Matter, comes to be laid before the Publick, I am well assured it will appear in quite another Light, than what the Enemies of the Government have ever represented.

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But the Part of this *Treaty*, which these Gentlemen pretend to take most Offence at, is what relates to securing *Don Carlos* the Succession stipulated for him by the *Quadruple Alliance*; which Alliance is confirm'd anew in this Treaty, as being one of those which were in Being between the two Nations before the Year 1725, all these Treaties are re-establish'd; we had no Right to pick and chuse, and to say, this Treaty shall be still in Force, but that shall not; all former Treaties are equally renew'd, and this among the rest. Had this Treaty been preceded by a vigorous War, which in the Prosecution of it, had turn'd greatly to the Advantage of one Side, and had reduc'd the other to a Necessity of Peace upon any Terms, the Conqueror will be allow'd to treat upon what Foot he pleases; he will alter, or annul, or add to the Articles of former Treaties, as he thinks fit; for his own, and his People's Interest; and the other Parties must submit. But the Case was widely different here, where all we had to claim, was, to be put into the State we were in before our late Differences; and there was no Pretence, without extreme Partiality and Insolence, to demand more. They, therefore, who find fault with this Part of the Treaty, if there be any Fault, must lay it on the *Ministers* who advis'd the *Quadruple Alliance*; but that Part of the *Quadruple Alliance*, which settled the Succession of *Don Carlos* to *Tuscany* and *Parma*, must ever appear a wise Provision to prevent a War, which would infallibly have broken out upon the Demise of those Princes. It will always be necessary, in order to preserve the Balance of Power, and our own Interest in the *Mediterranean Trade*, to keep *Italy* from falling under the Dominion of one Master; and therefore this Part of this Treaty needs no Excuse; which is, in this Point, but a Copy of the *Quadruple Alliance*, only

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with this Variation, that 6000 *Spaniards* are to Garison the Places named in the Treaty, to be paid by *Spain*, instead of 6000 *Swiss*, to be paid by the contracting Powers, *England*, *France* and *Spain* equally: Which was a very necessary Variation to secure the Points intended to be provided for by the Alliance. For twelve Years had pass'd from making of the *Quadruple Alliance*, by which 6000 *Swiss Troops* were forthwith to Garison those Places; and yet, after so many Years, nothing had been done towards putting this Part of the Treaty in Execution: No one of the 6000 *Swiss* had ever been sent; and the Succession of these Dominions continued as much expos'd in this Respect, as it did before the *Quadruple Alliance* was made. How then were *neutral Troops* more effectual, as our Writer says, for that Purpose, than *Spanish*?* Had not *Spain*, therefore, great Reason to insist on this Variation? Had the *Ministry* advis'd the King to break off the Treaty, rather than agree to it, should we not have had loud Complaints of the *Ministers*, as rejecting for a trifling Dispute, the most useful Alliance *England* can have, and throwing the Nation into a destructive War, which might have lasted long beyond the present Time, through an unpardonable want of Judgment, or to serve their own wicked Ends?†

As to the *Spanish* Garisons, they are as strictly oblig'd by this Treaty, as the neutral ones were to have been, not to interfere in any manner with the Government of those Countries, but to confine themselves barely to keeping Possession of the Places committed to their Care. Nor could the Emperor then be under any Apprehension of Danger on this Head, having constantly, in the

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* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 40.

† *Treaty of Seville examin'd.*

Neighbourhood of those Garisons, a Number of Troops more than sufficient to awe and check them, should they have offer'd to exceed the Bounds prescrib'd them; and he could, without doubt, as easily have kept them in Order, as he could the *Swiss*. * Besides, Though these Troops are *Spaniards*, were they not tied up by the Treaty, so as not to infringe the *Imperial Rights*, any more than those of the *Great Duke* himself? Is it not agreed by the Contracting Parties, that the *Spanish General* shall, upon no Account whatever, disturb the publick Tranquility? Has he not been oblig'd to take the Oath of Fidelity to the *Duke of Tuscany*, as well in his own Name, as for all the other Officers of the *Spanish Troops*? And are not the Troops restrain'd to *Pisa*, *Porto Ferrario* and *Leghorn*, without pretending, under any Pretext whatsoever, to distribute them into any other Places of the States, provided there be nothing done to frustrate the Succession of *Don Carlos*? † Were these Troops therefore employ'd to any Purposes, but that defensive one for which they were design'd, would it not be a Violation of the *Convention* between the *Catholick King*, and the Family *de Medicis*; and would it not thereby endanger the Succession in the highest Degree? In short, the *Imperial Rights* were as secure as they could possibly be, without endangering the Security of the Succession; and though his *Imperial Majesty* could not be brought to an Acquiescence in this Variation, without having the *Indivisibility* of his hereditary Dominions secur'd in his own Family, yet that is no Argument that the *Emperor* was any ways injur'd thereby. Nor indeed would the general Pacification have been compleated, had

* *Observations on the Treaty of Seville. Printed for Roberts, 1729.*

† *Roussel, Vol. VI.*

had not the Powers of *Europe* taken equal Care of the *Imperial Succession*, as they had before done of the *Tuscan*; for would not the Tranquility of *Europe* have been as liable to be broke through on the Demise of the *Emperor*, as on that of the *Duke of Tuscany*, had not the Succession of the one been provided against as well as the other? Was it not therefore the Interest of all *Europe*, as well as the natural Interest of *Britain*, to provide against the Partition of the *Austrian* Dominions and Countries, on Failure of Issue Male, to the *Emperor*? How then can this Provision for a Successor to the *Emperor*, be attended with more Distractions in *Europe*, as our Writer asserts, than if the Succession had been left to such a *Guaranty* as the Circumstances of *Europe* should dictate, when the Demise of the *Emperor* should happen? *France*, we know, oppos'd this *Guaranty* by Negotiation, and 'tis possible may attempt to do it by Force, when the Contingent shall happen, says our Writer.* But is it not more likely that *France* would more vigorously and more successfully oppose it, had not the great Powers of *Europe* guaranteed the *Pragmatick Sanction*? No Words can give us so lively a Representation of the Necessity of these *reciprocal Guarantees*, as a Reflection on the present Calamities of the *Poles*. Had this Succession, consistently with the Constitution of *Poland*, been guaranteed by a sufficient Force, no Prince in *Europe* would have presum'd to have disturb'd the general Tranquility. From what is the Fate of the *Poles*, may we not easily imagine, what would be the Fate of the *Imperialists*, were they left unprovided for a Successor? The Wisdom of these mutual Guarantees appears in no Case more conspicuous, than in our own Act of Settlement upon the House of *Hanover*. Had not this Succession been

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 60.

guaranteed by a powerful Neighbour, would not the Liberties of *Englishmen*, as well as those of all the Protestant Powers have been in Danger? Why then may not the Guarantee of the *Pragmatick Sanction* be as great a Preservative of the House of *Austria*, as a Guarantee to a Protestant Successor, was preservative of the Constitution of *England*? Experience therefore testifies, that no Practice among the Princes of *Europe*, tends more to preserve the general Tranquility than this; and consequently, the *Treaty of Seville* which provided for the peaceful Succession of *Don Carlos* in *Italy*, and that *Treaty* which does the same, as effectually as it is in the Power of human Wisdom to do, for a Successor to the *Emperor*, were wise and necessary Provisions. The Conduct of all the Princes of *Europe* have at one time or other justified the Reasonableness of this; and tho' our Author himself will upon no Account be brought to acknowledge it, because it runs counter to his ridiculous Schemes of Policy; yet unfortunately for him, by over-acting his Part, he acknowledges the Truth of what he would pretend to oppose, and pleads openly for the Necessity of such Security against Contingencies of the like Nature, in order to preserve the Peace of *Europe*. "It ought to be consider'd, says he, that although the particular Year, Month or Day, on which King *Augustus* would die, could not be foreseen; yet it is well known he was above Threescore Years of Age, and in a very infirm State of Health. No wise People therefore would care to pay for an *Annuity of Peace upon such a Life*; and we ought at least to be secur'd against a Contingency, which would not be very far off, according to the ordinary Course of Nature."* Is not this a most palpable Contradiction of his whole Tract; and in Effect his own Approbation of the Treaties of

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 66, 67.

of *Seville* and *Vienna*, he has so weakly endeavour'd to ridicule ?

But say our Objectors, “ if we had undertaken
 “ to effectuate the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with
 “ *Spanish* Garisons into *Italy*, at the Congress of
 “ *Cambray*, instead of opposing it with so much
 “ Vigour, the Court of *Spain* would have had no
 “ occasion to throw themselves into the Arms of
 “ the *Emperor* ; and if we had been happy enough
 “ at the same time to discover that the Guaranty
 “ of the *Pragmatick Sanction* was only a Bugbear,
 “ that frighted us without any reason, there is no
 “ room to suppose that the *Emperor* would not have
 “ comply'd with the Demand of the *Spaniards*
 “ upon that Condition, as readily as he hath done
 “ since.”* Now we will suppose for once, that
 we had, as these *Gentlemen* argue, been so obsequi-
 ously complaisant as to have comply'd with every
 Demand of the *Spaniards* and *Imperialists*, without
 any Equivalent at *Cambray* ; what would have been
 the Consequence of this great Condescension ?
 Would not this remarkable Flexibility in the Court
 of *Great Britain* have encourag'd these Powers to
 make further Demands ? Should we not have found
 the one, after that, insisting upon the Restitution
 of *Gibraltar*, and the other on the perpetual Esta-
 blishment of the *Ostend Trade* ? Tho' his late Maje-
 sty refus'd to guaranty the *Pragmatick Sanction*,
 when propos'd to him under the unlimited Terms
 of the *Aulique Council*, yet it argues no Levity or
 Inconsistency in Politicks for his present Majesty to
 come into it under such wise Restrictions and Li-
 mitations, as stipulated by the conclusive Treaty of
Vienna, viz. *That if the Arch-dutchess should marry in*
such a manner as to aggrandize any of the great Powers,
so as thereby to hazard the Balance of Europe, such a
Guaranty should be void, and of no effect. But had
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* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 64.

his Majesty acceded to it when first propos'd, without this wise Limitation, might we not have gave our Guaranty even to the aggrandizing of *Don Carlos*? And thus the Author of the Enquiry very justly argu'd, "Certainly, says he, no one can think
 " but that it was wisely and happily judg'd to refuse a Guaranty, which might have been attended with so fatal Consequences; for as the *Emperor's* Children are now Females only; and the
 " Influence of that Succession upon *Europe* must depend upon the Marriages of those Females;
 " and as no one then knew to what Princes they might be hereafter marry'd, it was wise in his
 " Majesty not to oblige himself to support a Succession, which might possibly, by some future
 " Marriage, become formidable to the rest of *Europe*, and fatal in the End to *Britain* it self." How then has the Author of the Enquiry, as our Writer asserts*, been given up in this Point of Argument?

When the Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain* was dissolv'd; when the *Spaniards* were divested of these Auxiliaries they depended on for the Acquisition of *Gibraltar*; when the *Emperor* was ready to abolish the *Ostend-Company*, and to accede to the Treaty of *Seville*; when this Revolution of Politicks was happily brought about, was it not as much agreeable to our natural Interest to guaranty the Imperial Succession under the Restrictions we did, as it would have been contrary to it to have done it when it was first propos'd?

Nor could his late Majesty, consistent with the Dignity of his Crown, have come into this Guaranty at the time it was offer'd him; for it was propos'd by his Imperial Majesty at the very Juncture that he had struck up the secret Treaty with *Spain*;
 and

* *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 56.

and most certainly the Proposition was then made, either to intimidate us into a Compliance, or to amuse and divert us from discovering the Part that was then acting at *Vienna*. As therefore his Majesty's Acceptance, at such a Juncture of Affairs, would have been derogatory to his Honour, both as Sovereign of *Great Britain*, and Mediator at *Cambray*, destructive of our most important Possessions and Privileges of Trade, and fatal to the *Equilibrium* of Power in *Europe*, will any Man say it was impolitic to refuse it? But certainly it would have been so, had we refus'd it on the happy Vicissitude of Affairs; for this Variation in the Plan of Power by the *Treaties of Vienna and Seville*, fix'd our Hopes of Tranquillity on much stronger Foundations than ever were laid before this time by any Treaty or Alliance whatsoever. At the Conclusion of this general Pacification we beheld the *Emperor* in cordial Friendship with his Majesty, perfectly easy in his Affairs with *France*, at no sort of Variance with *Spain*, but on the contrary their Friend and Ally, as necessary to support the Succession of *Don Carlos* in *Italy*. We saw the *Imperial Succession*, on Failure of the Male Line in the House of *Austria*, settled consistent with the Safety and the Satisfaction of *Europe*. We further saw the *Dutch*, our ancient and faithful Ally, acceding to our Treaties, and concurring in the same Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction. To the same Guaranty the Crown of *Spain* formerly, and the *Diet* of the Empire afterwards, respectively acceded. *France*, with relation to the Low Countries, consented in the Treaty of *Baden*. And all the other Princes of *Europe*, whether they guarantee the Settlement or remain neuter, all agree that it is for the Interest of *Europe*, that the *Austrian* Hereditary Countries ought to remain indivisibly united. This Settlement hath been sworn

to by all the collateral Branches of that Family ; who by Oath, as well as Compact, renounc'd their respective Claims which interfere with this Order of Succession. Was not this Conjunction of the *British Nation*, the *House of Austria*, and the *States-General*, the same grand Alliance whose former Union made the World tremble ? Could the Peace of *Europe* have had a better Security ?

We saw the Crowns of *Great Britain* and *France*, mutually dispos'd to live in perfect Amity, and reciprocally employing themselves in all the Offices of Friendship to each other. When the Enemies of Peace were labouring to create Jealousies between the two Courts, did not the *French* shew the Sincerity of their Desires to join the *British Ministers* in every Thing that might improve true Harmony between *Great Britain* and *France* ? Did not *France* give express Orders for demolishing the least Attempts which could have been made towards the Reparation of *Dunkirk* ? And did they not cause their Subjects to evacuate *Santa Lucia* ? Those, therefore, who have charg'd us with having dealt unfairly and unfaithfully with the *French*, had the Mortification to find, that they made Complaints FOR the *French*, which were never made BY the *French*. *

If we turn our Eyes to *Spain* and *Italy*, we behold the latter settled in Peace, and the former in Friendship with all the Powers of *Europe*, by that very Settlement ; a Prince of *Spain* peaceably introduc'd into *Tuscany*, with the Consent of all Parties, under Protection of *Great Britain*, the *States-General*, and the *Emperor*. This was the happy Situation of our Affairs, before the general Tranquility was disturb'd ; and no Time could ever

* *Natural Probability of a lasting Peace in Europe*, Pag. 16, 17
Printed for Peele, 1732.

ever produce one more promising of lasting Peace. How then were the very Measures we took for obtaining a lasting Peace, likely to involve us in a general War? By the *Treaty of Seville*, says our Writer, *which open'd a Way for the Spaniards into Italy*; and by the *last Treaty of Vienna*, *which compleated the Union between France and Spain*. † Will these Gentlemen presume to say that the same War, upon the Demise of the King of *Poland*, would not have sprung up in *Europe* under the *Quadruple Alliance*, as well as under that of *Seville*? Were these few *Spaniards*, admitted into *Tuscany* under such severe Restrictions, as above intimated, the efficient Cause of the *Triple Alliance*? If this *Alliance* might have taken Place, had the Peace of *Europe* continu'd under the *Quadruple Alliance*, how could this Variation in the Plan of Power, be any Cause of the present War? Had not the *Treaties of Seville* and *Vienna* been made, would not the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon* have contended who should be king of *Poland*? Would the *Quadruple Alliance* have been any Obstacle to that which has given *Spain* such Footing in *Italy*? We'll suppose that the Court of *Great Britain* had not happily separated the *Emperor* from *Spain*, would not the House of *Austria* have been as formidable as it was under *Charles* the 5th. Nay, would not the projected Intermarriages have been destructive of the Liberties of *Europe*? Since therefore it is certain there was a positive Ill remov'd by the Separation of those Powers, are we answerable for any consequential or accidental Ill that may arise from any after-Union of one of the separated Powers with others? Does the Separation of any Powers necessarily occasion any new *Treaties* or *Compacts* with others? Should we, in the present

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† *Politicks on both Sides*, Pag. 66.

Conjuncture, be able to separate the two most powerful Parties of the present Alliance, should we not do an immediate present Good to *Europe*? But if one of them should afterwards run into the Arms of another great Power, with the same hostile Intentions, is this to be imputed to our former good Policy, or any way to detract from it? The short Question is, Whether the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Seville* did not leave the *Equilibrium* of Power between the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, as equally and nicely poiz'd as ever it was left? Nothing is more inconstant, and difficult to maintain, than that *Equilibrium*; which cannot be preserved but by *that* of their Allies; and was that ever better adjusted, than by the late general Pacification? “ The *Ministers* of *England* are not the *Ministers* of *Europe*; but “ really by some *Gentlemens* way of talking, one “ would imagine they were: If any unforeseen “ Accidents Abroad, if the Ambition of any Foreign “ reign Prince, or the Misconduct of any Foreign “ Court produces any untoward Effects, or occasions any Trouble or Commotions in *Europe*, “ the *Ministers* of *England* are immediately loaded “ with the whole; it is they that have done the “ Mischief, and they must answer for it.”

You have here, *Sir*, the *Politicks* on both Sides, fairly and impartially review'd; I leave you to judge who have had the Honour and Interest of their Country at Heart, and who have been unwearied to destroy both. As I begin to grow bulky, I shall conclude with a short Remark, upon the boasted political Foresight and prophetick Spirit of our *Patriots*, which they would pretend runs through all their *Politicks*. They foretold the Perfidy of *France* in the *Treaty* of *Hanover*; that they would not demolish *Dunkirk*; that the

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Dutch would not accede to the *Treaty of Vienna*; that his late Majesty had promis'd, *bona fide*, to give up *Gibraltar*; that it would be actually betray'd, or taken from us by Force of Arms; that the *Ministry* would be chang'd, and they themselves at the Head of it; that the Liberty of the Press would be destroy'd, by Reason of their base and vile Artifices to corrupt the Judgment, and incense the Multitude against those who have done their Country the truest, the most faithful and important Services: In these, with many more Instances I could produce of the same Sort, is discover'd the *political Wisdom*, *Foresight* and *Divination* of our superlative *Patriots*. The whole of this Review is submitted to your impartial Consideration, and better Judgment, by,

S I R,

Your most Faithful,

Humble Servant.



W. B. R.

